Camil Golub
Biographic Data
| ID | 8840868 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Camil Golub |
| GIVEN NAMES | Camil |
| FAMILY NAME | Golub |
| SIGNATURE | GOLUB C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3934-5842 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
The Good, the Bad, and the Meaningful
Philosophers tend to treat meaningfulness as a type of value worth seeking and promoting, on a par with well-being and moral value. In this paper I argue that finding something in one’s life meaningful does not require attributing to it any substantive positive value, but rather it can be rooted in an attachment to one’s narrative identity or to one’s place in a broader story about the world. This proposal explains how we can find meaning in past…
Normative Reference as a Normative Question
Grief, Meaning, and Narratives
Grief after the loss of a loved one often involves profound experiences of meaninglessness rooted in the absence of the deceased. Yet many people recover from this crisis of meaning fairly quickly. Can we explain this return to a meaningful life in a way that does not reveal anything problematic about our rationality, or about the significance of our relationship to the person who died? I propose that we can find meaning in the loss of a loved on…
Representation, Deflationism, and the Question of Realism
How can we distinguish between quasi-realist expressivism and normative realism? The most promising answer to this question is the “explanation” explanation proposed by Dreier (2004), Simpson (2018), and others: the two views might agree in their claims about truth and objectivity, or even in their attributions of semantic content to normative sentences, but they disagree about how to explain normative meaning. Realists explain meaning by invokin…
Is there a Good Moral Argument against Moral Realism
It has been argued that there is something morally objectionable about moral realism: for instance, according to realism, we are justified in believing that genocide is wrong only if a certain moral fact obtains, but it is objectionable to hold our moral commitments hostage to metaphysics in this way. In this paper, I argue that no version of this moral argument against realism is likely to succeed. More precisely, minimal realism―the kind of rea…
Making Peace with Moral Imperfection
How can we rationally make peace with our past moral failings, while committing to avoid similar mistakes in the future? Is it because we cannot do anything about the past, while the future is still open? Or is it that regret for our past mistakes is psychologically harmful, and we need to forgive ourselves in order to be able to move on? Or is it because moral mistakes enable our moral growth? I argue that these and other answers do not properly…
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Making Peace with Moral Imperfection
How can we rationally make peace with our past moral failings, while committing to avoid similar mistakes in the future? Is it because we cannot do anything about the past, while the future is still open? Or is it that regret for our past mistakes is psychologically harmful, and we need to forgive ourselves in order to be able to move on? Or is it because moral mistakes enable our moral growth? I argue that these and other answers do not properly…
Representation, Deflationism, and the Question of Realism
How can we distinguish between quasi-realist expressivism and normative realism? The most promising answer to this question is the “explanation” explanation proposed by Dreier (2004), Simpson (2018), and others: the two views might agree in their claims about truth and objectivity, or even in their attributions of semantic content to normative sentences, but they disagree about how to explain normative meaning. Realists explain meaning by invokin…
Is there a Good Moral Argument against Moral Realism
It has been argued that there is something morally objectionable about moral realism: for instance, according to realism, we are justified in believing that genocide is wrong only if a certain moral fact obtains, but it is objectionable to hold our moral commitments hostage to metaphysics in this way. In this paper, I argue that no version of this moral argument against realism is likely to succeed. More precisely, minimal realism―the kind of rea…
Normative Reference as a Normative Question
Grief, Meaning, and Narratives
Grief after the loss of a loved one often involves profound experiences of meaninglessness rooted in the absence of the deceased. Yet many people recover from this crisis of meaning fairly quickly. Can we explain this return to a meaningful life in a way that does not reveal anything problematic about our rationality, or about the significance of our relationship to the person who died? I propose that we can find meaning in the loss of a loved on…
The Good, the Bad, and the Meaningful
Philosophers tend to treat meaningfulness as a type of value worth seeking and promoting, on a par with well-being and moral value. In this paper I argue that finding something in one’s life meaningful does not require attributing to it any substantive positive value, but rather it can be rooted in an attachment to one’s narrative identity or to one’s place in a broader story about the world. This proposal explains how we can find meaning in past…
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Moral psychology (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Expressivism (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Moral disengagement (2 works) · Moral realism (2 works)