Representation, Deflationism, and the Question of Realism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22109478 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Camil Golub (0000-0003-3934-5842, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 7 |
| Issue | 0 |
| Publication date | 2021-10-22 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2330-4014 • E-ISSN: 2330-4014 |
| Publisher | University of Michigan Library (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.3998/ergo.1133 |
| OpenAlex | W3208362797 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 16 |
How can we distinguish between quasi-realist expressivism and normative realism? The most promising answer to this question is the “explanation” explanation proposed by Dreier (2004), Simpson (2018), and others: the two views might agree in their claims about truth and objectivity, or even in their attributions of semantic content to normative sentences, but they disagree about how to explain normative meaning. Realists explain meaning by invoking normative facts and properties, or representational relations between normative language and the world, the thought goes, while expressivists appeal instead to desire-like mental states in their explanations of meaning. However, I argue that, if we adopt a deflationary approach to representation and other related notions, there need be no such explanatory divide between expressivism and anything recognizable as a plausible notion of normative realism. Any alleged explanatory criterion for realism will either be incompatible with deflationism, or it will fail to capture some standard versions of normative realism. I conclude that, in a deflationary framework, expressivism is compatible with genuine realism
Appeal · Epistemology · Expressivism · Moral psychology · Moral realism · Normative · Political science · Realism · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories
Being For
Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content
Putnam's paradox
New work for a theory of universals
Should Expressivism Be a Theory at the Level of Metasemantics?
From Quasi-Realism to Global Expressivism—and Back Again?
Meaning and Normativity
Expressivism, Pragmatism and Representationalism
Non-Naturalism and Reference
The Meaning of ‘Ought’
Expressivism, Inferentialism, and Saving the Debate
Deflationism, Creeping Minimalism, and Explanations of Content
Expressivism, Belief, and All That
Inferentialist metaethics, bifurcations and ontological commitment
What is Global Expressivism
| Citations per year | 1.33 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2023 - 2025 (3) |
| Highly cited | No |