Chad Kendall
Biographic Data
| ID | 8880188 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Chad Kendall |
| GIVEN NAMES | Chad |
| FAMILY NAME | Kendall |
| SIGNATURE | KENDALL C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Southern California |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Herding and Contrarianism
Herding and contrarian strategies produce informational inefficiencies when investors ignore private information, instead following or bucking past trends. In a simple market model, I show theoretically that investors with prospect theory preferences generically follow herding or contrarian strategies, but do so because of future returns as opposed to past trends. I conduct a laboratory experiment to test the theory and obtain an estimate of the …
How Do Voters Respond to Information? Evidence from a Randomized Campaign
In a large-scale controlled trial in collaboration with the reelection campaign of an Italian incumbent mayor, we administered (randomized) messages about the candidate's valence or ideology. Informational treatments affected both actual votes in the precincts and individual vote declarations. Campaigning on valence brought more votes to the incumbent, but both messages affected voters' beliefs. Cross-learning occurred, as voters who received inf…
No prominent works on this page.
How Do Voters Respond to Information? Evidence from a Randomized Campaign
In a large-scale controlled trial in collaboration with the reelection campaign of an Italian incumbent mayor, we administered (randomized) messages about the candidate's valence or ideology. Informational treatments affected both actual votes in the precincts and individual vote declarations. Campaigning on valence brought more votes to the incumbent, but both messages affected voters' beliefs. Cross-learning occurred, as voters who received inf…
Herding and Contrarianism
Herding and contrarian strategies produce informational inefficiencies when investors ignore private information, instead following or bucking past trends. In a simple market model, I show theoretically that investors with prospect theory preferences generically follow herding or contrarian strategies, but do so because of future returns as opposed to past trends. I conduct a laboratory experiment to test the theory and obtain an estimate of the …
Economics (2 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works) · Media Influence and Politics (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Contrarian (1 work) · Counterfactual thinking (1 work) · Econometrics (1 work) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (1 work) · Financial economics (1 work) · Financial Markets and Investment Strategies (1 work)