Herding and Contrarianism
A Matter of Preference
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19317569 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Chad Kendall (University of Southern California, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 105 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 190-205 |
| Publication date | 2023-01-06 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Review of Economics and Statistics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-6535 • E-ISSN: 1530-9142 |
| Publisher | MIT Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1162/rest_a_01028 |
| OpenAlex | W3158978129 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 43 |
Herding and contrarian strategies produce informational inefficiencies when investors ignore private information, instead following or bucking past trends. In a simple market model, I show theoretically that investors with prospect theory preferences generically follow herding or contrarian strategies, but do so because of future returns as opposed to past trends. I conduct a laboratory experiment to test the theory and obtain an estimate of the distribution of preferences in the subject population. I find that approximately 70% of subjects have preferences that induce herding. Using the preference estimates, I quantify informational efficiencies and predict trade behavior in more general environments
Contrarian · Econometrics · Economics · Financial economics · Geography · Herd behavior · Herding · Microeconomics · Population · Preference · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Financial Markets and Investment Strategies · Media Influence and Politics
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| Highly cited | No |
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