Nadine Elzein
Biographic Data
| ID | 8995624 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nadine Elzein |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nadine |
| FAMILY NAME | Elzein |
| SIGNATURE | ELZEIN N |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Warwick |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0312-2233 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Crime, Public Health, and Inhumane Objectivity
The suggestion that crime be treated as a public health problem instead of being treated retributively provokes unease for two reasons. Firstly, it is thought to foster impersonal treatment, which is “objectifying” or “dehumanizing.” I argue that practices are problematically impersonal when they bypass or undermine an agent’s ability to take responsibility. However, there is a difference between taken responsibility and retributive responsibilit…
Undetermined Choices, Luck and the Enhancement Problem
If indeterminism is to be necessary for moral responsibility, we must show that it doesn’t preclude responsibility (the Luck Problem) and that it might enhance it (the Enhancement Problem). A ‘strong luck claim’ motivates the Luck Problem: if an agent’s choice is undetermined, then her mental life will be causally irrelevant to her choice, whichever way she decides. A ‘weak luck claim’ motivates the Enhancement Problem: if an agent’s choice is un…
Relativism, Fallibilism, and the Need for Interpretive Charity
‘Relativists' and ‘absolutists' about truth often see their own camp as promoting virtues, such as open-mindedness and intellectual humility, and see the opposing camp as fostering vices, like closed-mindedness and arrogance. Relativism is accused of fostering these vices because it entails that each person’s beliefs are automatically right for the person who holds them. How can we be humble or open-minded if we cannot concede that we might be wr…
Moral alternatives, physical determinism & Frankfurt-style counterexamples
Agents in Frankfurt-style counterexamples only appear to be responsible insofar as they act willingly in the actual sequence, but would need to be manipulated against their will into forming the relevant intention in the alternative sequence. This difference appears ineliminable and unavoidably morally significant. ‘Neo-Frankfurtians’ concede that the sequences must be physically differentiated, but deny their moral differentiation. In contrast, …
Determinism, 'Ought' Implies 'Can' and Moral Obligation
Haji argues that determinism threatens deontic morality, not via athreat to moral responsibility, but directly, because of the principlethat "ought" implies "can". Haji's argument requires not only that weembrace an "ought" implies "can" principle, but also that we adopt theprinciple that "ought" implies "able not to". I argue that we havelittle reason to adopt the latter principle, and examine whether deonticmorality might be destroyed on the ba…
No prominent works on this page.
Determinism, 'Ought' Implies 'Can' and Moral Obligation
Haji argues that determinism threatens deontic morality, not via athreat to moral responsibility, but directly, because of the principlethat "ought" implies "can". Haji's argument requires not only that weembrace an "ought" implies "can" principle, but also that we adopt theprinciple that "ought" implies "able not to". I argue that we havelittle reason to adopt the latter principle, and examine whether deonticmorality might be destroyed on the ba…
Relativism, Fallibilism, and the Need for Interpretive Charity
‘Relativists' and ‘absolutists' about truth often see their own camp as promoting virtues, such as open-mindedness and intellectual humility, and see the opposing camp as fostering vices, like closed-mindedness and arrogance. Relativism is accused of fostering these vices because it entails that each person’s beliefs are automatically right for the person who holds them. How can we be humble or open-minded if we cannot concede that we might be wr…
Moral alternatives, physical determinism & Frankfurt-style counterexamples
Agents in Frankfurt-style counterexamples only appear to be responsible insofar as they act willingly in the actual sequence, but would need to be manipulated against their will into forming the relevant intention in the alternative sequence. This difference appears ineliminable and unavoidably morally significant. ‘Neo-Frankfurtians’ concede that the sequences must be physically differentiated, but deny their moral differentiation. In contrast, …
Undetermined Choices, Luck and the Enhancement Problem
If indeterminism is to be necessary for moral responsibility, we must show that it doesn’t preclude responsibility (the Luck Problem) and that it might enhance it (the Enhancement Problem). A ‘strong luck claim’ motivates the Luck Problem: if an agent’s choice is undetermined, then her mental life will be causally irrelevant to her choice, whichever way she decides. A ‘weak luck claim’ motivates the Enhancement Problem: if an agent’s choice is un…
Crime, Public Health, and Inhumane Objectivity
The suggestion that crime be treated as a public health problem instead of being treated retributively provokes unease for two reasons. Firstly, it is thought to foster impersonal treatment, which is “objectifying” or “dehumanizing.” I argue that practices are problematically impersonal when they bypass or undermine an agent’s ability to take responsibility. However, there is a difference between taken responsibility and retributive responsibilit…
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Determinism (3 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Compatibilism (2 works) · Free will (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Moral responsibility (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works)