Moral alternatives, physical determinism & Frankfurt-style counterexamples
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21335263 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nadine Elzein (0000-0003-0312-2233, Lady Margaret Hall, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 65 |
| Issue | 10 |
| Pages | 1231-1249 |
| Publication date | 2022-11-26 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Inquiry (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0020-174X • E-ISSN: 1502-3923 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/0020174x.2021.1904642 |
| OpenAlex | W3139672593 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 21 |
Agents in Frankfurt-style counterexamples only appear to be responsible insofar as they act willingly in the actual sequence, but would need to be manipulated against their will into forming the relevant intention in the alternative sequence. This difference appears ineliminable and unavoidably morally significant. ‘Neo-Frankfurtians’ concede that the sequences must be physically differentiated, but deny their moral differentiation. In contrast, I explore whether the alternatives could be physically undifferentiated, despite their moral difference. The reason there is an ineliminable moral difference is because there is an ineliminable causal one: The agent’s choice must be caused by his own inclinations in one sequence, but by Black’s manipulation in the other. Whether this causal difference entails a physical one depends on whether we suppose causal relations conform to Humean supervenience. The denial of the latter requires us to either reject any broadly Humean view of causation, or else to suppose that we can individuate events or their qualities independently of the physical facts. If these are coherent possibilities, such examples may show that physically differentiated alternatives are not required for moral responsibility. This could support compatibilism, but only if such examples adequately parallel determinism, and I remain sceptical on this point
Causation · Compatibilism · Counterexample · Denial · Determinism · Epistemology · Free will · Incompatibilism · Metaphysics · Moral responsibility · Sequence (biology) · Skepticism · Style (visual arts) · Supervenience · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility
Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives
Going through the Open Door Again
Dialectical Delicacies in the Debate About Freedom and Alternative Possibilities
On the individuation of events
The Frankfurt Cases
Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases
Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities
Causation
Why Frankfurt-Examples Don’t Need to Succeed to Succeed
Contrastive Explanation and the Demons of Determinism
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |