Nils‐Eric Sahlin
Biographic Data
| ID | 9197239 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nils‐Eric Sahlin |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nils‐Eric |
| FAMILY NAME | Sahlin |
| SIGNATURE | SAHLIN N E |
| AFFILIATIONS | Center for Philosophy of Science University of Pittsburgh |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1993 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Unsharp Sharpness
In a recent, thought‐provoking paper A dam E lga ((2010) argues against unsharp – e.g., indeterminate, fuzzy and unreliable – probabilities. Rationality demands sharpness, he contends, and this means that decision theories like L evi's (1980, 1988), G ärdenfors and S ahlin's (1982), and K yburg's (1983), though they employ different decision rules, face a common, and serious, problem. This article defends the rule to maximize minimum expected uti…
Ethical theory and the philosophy of risk: First thoughts
Contemporary psychological research has shown that if we are judged by the standards of classical models of rationality our decision-making abilities can be seriously questioned. We are more or less irrational. The article investigates how this 'fact of irrationality' affects the way normative ethical theories should be formulated and the extent to which currently dominant ethical theories can be taken seriously as normative ideals of actual huma…
Worthy of choice
Ethical theory and the philosophy of risk: First thoughts
Contemporary psychological research has shown that if we are judged by the standards of classical models of rationality our decision-making abilities can be seriously questioned. We are more or less irrational. The article investigates how this 'fact of irrationality' affects the way normative ethical theories should be formulated and the extent to which currently dominant ethical theories can be taken seriously as normative ideals of actual huma…
Worthy of choice
Ethical theory and the philosophy of risk: First thoughts
Contemporary psychological research has shown that if we are judged by the standards of classical models of rationality our decision-making abilities can be seriously questioned. We are more or less irrational. The article investigates how this 'fact of irrationality' affects the way normative ethical theories should be formulated and the extent to which currently dominant ethical theories can be taken seriously as normative ideals of actual huma…
Unsharp Sharpness
In a recent, thought‐provoking paper A dam E lga ((2010) argues against unsharp – e.g., indeterminate, fuzzy and unreliable – probabilities. Rationality demands sharpness, he contends, and this means that decision theories like L evi's (1980, 1988), G ärdenfors and S ahlin's (1982), and K yburg's (1983), though they employ different decision rules, face a common, and serious, problem. This article defends the rule to maximize minimum expected uti…
Sociology (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Art history (1 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works) · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference (1 works) · Citation (1 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (1 works)