Unsharp Sharpness
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20142873 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nils-Eric Sahlin (0000-0002-7240-371X, University of Pittsburgh), Nils‐Eric Sahlin (Center for Philosophy of Science University of Pittsburgh), Paul Weirich (0000-0002-1074-6565, Center for Philosophy of Science University of Pittsburgh) |
| Year | 2014 |
| Volume | 80 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 100-103 |
| Publication date | 2014-02-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12025 |
| OpenAlex | W2318924864 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 5 |
In a recent, thought‐provoking paper A dam E lga ((2010) argues against unsharp – e.g., indeterminate, fuzzy and unreliable – probabilities. Rationality demands sharpness, he contends, and this means that decision theories like L evi's (1980, 1988), G ärdenfors and S ahlin's (1982), and K yburg's (1983), though they employ different decision rules, face a common, and serious, problem. This article defends the rule to maximize minimum expected utility against E lga's objection
Epistemology · Face (sociological concept) · Fuzzy logic · Indeterminate · Mathematical economics · Rationality · Social science · Sociology · Artificial Intelligence · Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,71 |
| Citation span | 2019 - 2022 (4) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |