Paul Weirich
Biographic Data
| ID | 462385 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Paul Weirich |
| GIVEN NAMES | Paul |
| FAMILY NAME | Weirich |
| SIGNATURE | WEIRICH P |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Missouri |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1074-6565 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 18 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 13 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 17 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1983 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Coordination and Hyperrationality
Margaret Gilbert (1990) argues that although the rationality of the agents in a standard coordination problem does not suffice for their coordination, a social convention of coordination, understood as the agents’ joint acceptance of a principle requiring their coordination, does the job. Gilbert’s argument targets agents rational in the game-theoretic sense, which following Sobel (1994: Chap. 14), I call hyperrational agents. I agree that hyperr…
La théorie de la décision généralisée
Les principes de la théorie de la décision évaluent les actions sur le plan de la rationalité. L’article étend ces principes aux actions collectives. Il montre quels aspects des actions, individuelles et collectives, permettent de les évaluer sur le plan de la rationalité. La rationalité s’applique différemment selon que l’agent contrôle directement ou indirectement ses actions. Un groupe agit en conséquence des actes de ses membres et ainsi diri…
The Prisoner's Dilemma
The Prisoner's Dilemma is one of the most fiercely debated thought experiments in philosophy and the social sciences, presenting the simple insight that when two or more agents interact, the actions that most benefit each individual may not benefit the group. The fact that when you do what is best for you, and I do what is best for me, we end up in a situation that is worse for both of us makes the Prisoner's Dilemma relevant to a broad range of …
Unsharp Sharpness
In a recent, thought‐provoking paper A dam E lga ((2010) argues against unsharp – e.g., indeterminate, fuzzy and unreliable – probabilities. Rationality demands sharpness, he contends, and this means that decision theories like L evi's (1980, 1988), G ärdenfors and S ahlin's (1982), and K yburg's (1983), though they employ different decision rules, face a common, and serious, problem. This article defends the rule to maximize minimum expected uti…
Collective acts
Utility and framing
Exclusion from the social contract
Does rational bargaining yield a social contract that is efficient and so inclusive? A core allocation, that is, an allocation that gives each coalition at least as much as it can get on its own, is efficient. However, some coalitional games lack a core allocation, so rationality does not require one in those games. Does rationality therefore permit exclusion from the social contract? I replace realization of a core allocation with another type o…
Initiating Coordination
How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the payoff matrix and of each player's utility maximization among his strategies does not suffice. This paper argues that utility maximization among intentions and then acts generates coordination yielding a payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium
Labeling Genetically Modified Food: The Philosophical and Legal Debate
Risk's Place in Decision Rules
Equilibrium and Rationality: Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules
This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditio…
Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill, et l'economie politique
Adam Morton on Dilemmas
Adam Morton treats decisions that are difficult because the options available serve incomparable desires. In the first part of the book he presents principles that address these dilemmas. In the second part he formulates a theory that categorizes the principles. And in the third part he applies the principles to some issues in ethics. To illustrate, let us consider one of the principles, its assignment to a category, and its application to an eth…
Liberal Utilitarianism
Hierarchical Maximization of Two Kinds of Expected Utility
Causal decision theory produces decision instability in cases such as Death in Damascus where a decision itself provides evidence concerning the utility of options. Several authors have proposed ways of handling this instability. William Harper (1985 and 1986) advances one of the most elegant proposals. He recommends maximizing causal expected utility among the options that are causally ratifiable. Unfortunately, Harper's proposal imposes certain…
Rousseau on Proportional Majority Rule
Rousseau held that ideally we ought to be governed by the general will. However, since the general will is often hard to determine, he proposed majority rule as the best practical approximation to government by the general will. More specifically, he proposed proportional majority rule and not simple majority rule. That is, the more important a motion, the larger the majority required for passing it, unless circumstances are pressing. For example…
Expected Utility and Risk
The rule to maximize expected utility is intended for decisions where options involve risk. In those decisions the decision maker's attitude toward risk is important, and the rule ought to take it into account. Allais's and Ellsberg's paradoxes, however, suggest that the rule ignores attitudes toward risk. This suggestion is supported by recent psychological studies of decisions. These studies present a great variety of cases where apparently rat…
Conditional Probabilities and Probabilities Given Knowledge of a Condition
The conditional probability of h given e is commonly claimed to be equal to the probability that h would have if e were learned. Here I contend that this general claim about conditional probabilities is false. I present a counter-example that involves probabilities of probabilities, a second that involves probabilities of possible future actions, and a third that involves probabilities of indicative conditionals. In addition, I briefly defend the…
Expected Utility and Risk
The rule to maximize expected utility is intended for decisions where options involve risk. In those decisions the decision maker's attitude toward risk is important, and the rule ought to take it into account. Allais's and Ellsberg's paradoxes, however, suggest that the rule ignores attitudes toward risk. This suggestion is supported by recent psychological studies of decisions. These studies present a great variety of cases where apparently rat…
Exclusion from the social contract
Does rational bargaining yield a social contract that is efficient and so inclusive? A core allocation, that is, an allocation that gives each coalition at least as much as it can get on its own, is efficient. However, some coalitional games lack a core allocation, so rationality does not require one in those games. Does rationality therefore permit exclusion from the social contract? I replace realization of a core allocation with another type o…
Initiating Coordination
How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the payoff matrix and of each player's utility maximization among his strategies does not suffice. This paper argues that utility maximization among intentions and then acts generates coordination yielding a payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium
Risk's Place in Decision Rules
Hierarchical Maximization of Two Kinds of Expected Utility
Causal decision theory produces decision instability in cases such as Death in Damascus where a decision itself provides evidence concerning the utility of options. Several authors have proposed ways of handling this instability. William Harper (1985 and 1986) advances one of the most elegant proposals. He recommends maximizing causal expected utility among the options that are causally ratifiable. Unfortunately, Harper's proposal imposes certain…
Conditional Probabilities and Probabilities Given Knowledge of a Condition
The conditional probability of h given e is commonly claimed to be equal to the probability that h would have if e were learned. Here I contend that this general claim about conditional probabilities is false. I present a counter-example that involves probabilities of probabilities, a second that involves probabilities of possible future actions, and a third that involves probabilities of indicative conditionals. In addition, I briefly defend the…
Conditional Probabilities and Probabilities Given Knowledge of a Condition
The conditional probability of h given e is commonly claimed to be equal to the probability that h would have if e were learned. Here I contend that this general claim about conditional probabilities is false. I present a counter-example that involves probabilities of probabilities, a second that involves probabilities of possible future actions, and a third that involves probabilities of indicative conditionals. In addition, I briefly defend the…
Rousseau on Proportional Majority Rule
Rousseau held that ideally we ought to be governed by the general will. However, since the general will is often hard to determine, he proposed majority rule as the best practical approximation to government by the general will. More specifically, he proposed proportional majority rule and not simple majority rule. That is, the more important a motion, the larger the majority required for passing it, unless circumstances are pressing. For example…
Expected Utility and Risk
The rule to maximize expected utility is intended for decisions where options involve risk. In those decisions the decision maker's attitude toward risk is important, and the rule ought to take it into account. Allais's and Ellsberg's paradoxes, however, suggest that the rule ignores attitudes toward risk. This suggestion is supported by recent psychological studies of decisions. These studies present a great variety of cases where apparently rat…
Hierarchical Maximization of Two Kinds of Expected Utility
Causal decision theory produces decision instability in cases such as Death in Damascus where a decision itself provides evidence concerning the utility of options. Several authors have proposed ways of handling this instability. William Harper (1985 and 1986) advances one of the most elegant proposals. He recommends maximizing causal expected utility among the options that are causally ratifiable. Unfortunately, Harper's proposal imposes certain…
Liberal Utilitarianism
Adam Morton on Dilemmas
Adam Morton treats decisions that are difficult because the options available serve incomparable desires. In the first part of the book he presents principles that address these dilemmas. In the second part he formulates a theory that categorizes the principles. And in the third part he applies the principles to some issues in ethics. To illustrate, let us consider one of the principles, its assignment to a category, and its application to an eth…
Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill, et l'economie politique
Risk's Place in Decision Rules
Equilibrium and Rationality: Game Theory Revised by Decision Rules
This book represents a major contribution to game theory. It offers this conception of equilibrium in games: strategic equilibrium. This conception arises from a study of expected utility decision principles, which must be revised to take account of the evidence a choice provides concerning its outcome. The argument for these principles distinguishes reasons for action from incentives, and draws on contemporary analyses of counterfactual conditio…
Initiating Coordination
How do rational agents coordinate in a single-stage, noncooperative game? Common knowledge of the payoff matrix and of each player's utility maximization among his strategies does not suffice. This paper argues that utility maximization among intentions and then acts generates coordination yielding a payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium
Labeling Genetically Modified Food: The Philosophical and Legal Debate
Utility and framing
Exclusion from the social contract
Does rational bargaining yield a social contract that is efficient and so inclusive? A core allocation, that is, an allocation that gives each coalition at least as much as it can get on its own, is efficient. However, some coalitional games lack a core allocation, so rationality does not require one in those games. Does rationality therefore permit exclusion from the social contract? I replace realization of a core allocation with another type o…
Collective acts
Unsharp Sharpness
In a recent, thought‐provoking paper A dam E lga ((2010) argues against unsharp – e.g., indeterminate, fuzzy and unreliable – probabilities. Rationality demands sharpness, he contends, and this means that decision theories like L evi's (1980, 1988), G ärdenfors and S ahlin's (1982), and K yburg's (1983), though they employ different decision rules, face a common, and serious, problem. This article defends the rule to maximize minimum expected uti…
La théorie de la décision généralisée
Les principes de la théorie de la décision évaluent les actions sur le plan de la rationalité. L’article étend ces principes aux actions collectives. Il montre quels aspects des actions, individuelles et collectives, permettent de les évaluer sur le plan de la rationalité. La rationalité s’applique différemment selon que l’agent contrôle directement ou indirectement ses actions. Un groupe agit en conséquence des actes de ses membres et ainsi diri…
The Prisoner's Dilemma
The Prisoner's Dilemma is one of the most fiercely debated thought experiments in philosophy and the social sciences, presenting the simple insight that when two or more agents interact, the actions that most benefit each individual may not benefit the group. The fact that when you do what is best for you, and I do what is best for me, we end up in a situation that is worse for both of us makes the Prisoner's Dilemma relevant to a broad range of …
Coordination and Hyperrationality
Margaret Gilbert (1990) argues that although the rationality of the agents in a standard coordination problem does not suffice for their coordination, a social convention of coordination, understood as the agents’ joint acceptance of a principle requiring their coordination, does the job. Gilbert’s argument targets agents rational in the game-theoretic sense, which following Sobel (1994: Chap. 14), I call hyperrational agents. I agree that hyperr…
Mathematical economics (12 works) · Philosophy (12 works) · Computer Science (11 works) · Economics (10 works) · Epistemology (10 works) · Mathematics (9 works) · Microeconomics (6 works) · Rationality (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Artificial Intelligence (5 works)