Coordination and Hyperrationality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19475677 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paul Weirich (0000-0002-1074-6565, corresponding author), ProtoSociology Project |
| Year | 2018 |
| Volume | 35 |
| Pages | 197-214 |
| Publication date | 2018-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | ProtoSociology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1434-4319 |
| Publisher | Philosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.5840/protosociology20183511 |
| OpenAlex | W2956362318 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
Margaret Gilbert (1990) argues that although the rationality of the agents in a standard coordination problem does not suffice for their coordination, a social convention of coordination, understood as the agents’ joint acceptance of a principle requiring their coordination, does the job. Gilbert’s argument targets agents rational in the game-theoretic sense, which following Sobel (1994: Chap. 14), I call hyperrational agents. I agree that hyperrational agents may fail to coordinate in some cases despite the obvious benefits of coordination. However, I add that fully rational agents, who rationally exercise rationality’s permissions, may coordinate in these cases without jointly accepting a principle of coordination. I make this point using a model that adopts common simplifying assumptions about agents and their coordination problems
Convention · Coordination game · Epistemology · Mathematical economics · Political science · Rational agent · Rationality · Computer Science · Doping in Sports · Free Will and Agency · Law · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Artificial Intelligence
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,33 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2023 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |