CHRISTOPH JÄGER
Biographic Data
| ID | 9197344 |
|---|---|
| NAME | CHRISTOPH JÄGER |
| GIVEN NAMES | CHRISTOPH |
| FAMILY NAME | JÄGER |
| SIGNATURE | JAGER C |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Religious experience and the probability of theism: Comments on Swinburne
I discuss the role of religious experience in Richard Swinburne's probabilistic case for theism. Swinburne draws on his principle of credulity to argue that, if in addition to other evidence we consider that many people have theistic religious experiences, theism comes out as more probable than not. However, on many plausible probability assignments for the relevant non-experiential evidence, the conditional probability of theism already converge…
Process Reliabilism and the Value Problem
Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson have recently proposed a novel solution to the value problem in epistemology, i.e., to the question of how to account for the apparent surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief. Their “conditional probability solution” maintains that even simple process reliabilism can account for the added value of knowledge, since forming true beliefs in a reliable way raises the objective probability that the subject will h…
Reliability and Future True Belief: Reply to Olsson and Jönsson
In “Process Reliabilism and the Value Problem” I argue that Erik Olsson and Alvin Goldman's conditional probability solution to the value problem in epistemology is unsuccessful and that it makes significant internalist concessions. In “Kinds of Learning and the Likelihood of Future True Beliefs” Olsson and Martin Jönsson try to show that my argument does “not in the end reduce the plausibility” of Olsson and Goldman's account. Here I argue that,…
Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement: Proceedings of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, 2011
This volume collects papers that were presented at the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium 2011 in Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria. They focus on five key debates in contemporary epistemology: Does the term “to know” vary its meaning according to features of the contexts in which it is uttered? What role may “epistemic virtues” play in our cognitive activities? What is the surplus value of having knowledge instead of mere true belief? …
No prominent works on this page.
Epistemology: Contexts, Values, Disagreement: Proceedings of the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium in Kirchberg, 2011
This volume collects papers that were presented at the 34th International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium 2011 in Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria. They focus on five key debates in contemporary epistemology: Does the term “to know” vary its meaning according to features of the contexts in which it is uttered? What role may “epistemic virtues” play in our cognitive activities? What is the surplus value of having knowledge instead of mere true belief? …
Process Reliabilism and the Value Problem
Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson have recently proposed a novel solution to the value problem in epistemology, i.e., to the question of how to account for the apparent surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief. Their “conditional probability solution” maintains that even simple process reliabilism can account for the added value of knowledge, since forming true beliefs in a reliable way raises the objective probability that the subject will h…
Reliability and Future True Belief: Reply to Olsson and Jönsson
In “Process Reliabilism and the Value Problem” I argue that Erik Olsson and Alvin Goldman's conditional probability solution to the value problem in epistemology is unsuccessful and that it makes significant internalist concessions. In “Kinds of Learning and the Likelihood of Future True Beliefs” Olsson and Martin Jönsson try to show that my argument does “not in the end reduce the plausibility” of Olsson and Goldman's account. Here I argue that,…
Religious experience and the probability of theism: Comments on Swinburne
I discuss the role of religious experience in Richard Swinburne's probabilistic case for theism. Swinburne draws on his principle of credulity to argue that, if in addition to other evidence we consider that many people have theistic religious experiences, theism comes out as more probable than not. However, on many plausible probability assignments for the relevant non-experiential evidence, the conditional probability of theism already converge…
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Process (computing) (2 works) · Psychology (2 works)