Process Reliabilism and the Value Problem
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143676 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Colin Jager (0000-0003-1962-158X, Universität Innsbruck, corresponding author), CHRISTOPH JÄGER |
| Year | 2011 |
| Volume | 77 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 201-213 |
| Publication date | 2011-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2011.01102.x |
| OpenAlex | W2170270053 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 5 |
| References cited | 11 |
Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson have recently proposed a novel solution to the value problem in epistemology, i.e., to the question of how to account for the apparent surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief. Their “conditional probability solution” maintains that even simple process reliabilism can account for the added value of knowledge, since forming true beliefs in a reliable way raises the objective probability that the subject will have more true belief of a similar kind in the future. I argue that this proposal confronts significant internal problems and implicitly invokes higher‐level epistemic conditions that run against the spirit of externalism
Epistemology · Externalism · Internalism and externalism · Mathematical economics · Process (computing) · Simple (philosophy) · Statistics · Subject (documents) · Value (mathematics) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Reliability and Future True Belief
A New Argument for Goldman and Olsson's Solution to the Extra‐Value‐of‐Knowledge Problem
Kinds of Learning and the Likelihood of Future True Beliefs
Re‐examining the ancient roots of the concept of intellectual virtue
How to justify beliefs about the future - some epistemological remarks
| Unique citing works | 5 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,33 |
| Citation span | 2011 - 2025 (15) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 5 |