Jacques‐Henri Vollet
Biographic Data
| ID | 9197364 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jacques‐Henri Vollet |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jacques‐Henri |
| FAMILY NAME | Vollet |
| SIGNATURE | VOLLET J H |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Geneva |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2005-0091 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Antiluminosity, Excuses and the Sufficiency of Knowledge for Rational Action
Certainty and Assertion
It is widely held that assertions are partially governed by an epistemic norm. But what is the epistemic condition set out in the norm? Is it knowledge, truth, belief, or something else? In this paper, I defend a view similar to that of Stanley (2008), according to which the relevant epistemic condition is epistemic certainty, where epistemic certainty (but not knowledge) is context-sensitive. I start by distinguishing epistemic certainty, subjec…
Refined Invariantism
A certain number of cases suggest that our willingness to ascribe “knowledge” can be influenced by practical factors. For revisionary proposals, they indicate that the truth‐values of “knowledge” ascriptions vary with practical factors. For conservative proposals, on the contrary, nothing surprising is happening. Standard pragmatic approaches appeal to pragmatic implicatures and psychological approaches to the idea that belief formation is influe…
No prominent works on this page.
Certainty and Assertion
It is widely held that assertions are partially governed by an epistemic norm. But what is the epistemic condition set out in the norm? Is it knowledge, truth, belief, or something else? In this paper, I defend a view similar to that of Stanley (2008), according to which the relevant epistemic condition is epistemic certainty, where epistemic certainty (but not knowledge) is context-sensitive. I start by distinguishing epistemic certainty, subjec…
Refined Invariantism
A certain number of cases suggest that our willingness to ascribe “knowledge” can be influenced by practical factors. For revisionary proposals, they indicate that the truth‐values of “knowledge” ascriptions vary with practical factors. For conservative proposals, on the contrary, nothing surprising is happening. Standard pragmatic approaches appeal to pragmatic implicatures and psychological approaches to the idea that belief formation is influe…
Antiluminosity, Excuses and the Sufficiency of Knowledge for Rational Action
Computer Science (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Assertion (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Action (physics) (1 work) · Appeal (1 work) · Certainty (1 work)