Refined Invariantism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143666 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jacques‐Henri Vollet (0000-0003-2005-0091, University of Geneva, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 86 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 100-127 |
| Publication date | 2020-02-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.12221 |
| OpenAlex | W4256451021 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 4 |
| References cited | 40 |
A certain number of cases suggest that our willingness to ascribe “knowledge” can be influenced by practical factors. For revisionary proposals, they indicate that the truth‐values of “knowledge” ascriptions vary with practical factors. For conservative proposals, on the contrary, nothing surprising is happening. Standard pragmatic approaches appeal to pragmatic implicatures and psychological approaches to the idea that belief formation is influenced by practical factors. Conservative proposals have not yet offered a fully satisfactory explanation, though. In this article, I introduce and defend a third conservative proposal which I call “Refined Invariantism”. The two main claims of this proposal are that (1) we should distinguish between high stakes cases in which the subject does not believe (that he knows) the target proposition and those in which he believes (that he knows) the target proposition and that (2) we should adopt a psychological treatment for the first kind of case and a pragmatic treatment based on the epistemic standards for appropriate assertion and action for the second kind of case. I argue that this new combined approach avoids the main pitfalls of its two conservative rivals and that it gives new life to the generality objection levelled against revisionary views
Action (physics) · Appeal · Assertion · Epistemology · Generality · Nothing · Political science · Proposition · Subject (documents) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
On Folk Epistemology
Knowledge and Practical Interests
Knowledge in an Uncertain World
Motivated closing of the mind
Epistemic Anxiety and Adaptive Invariantism
The pragmatics of pragmatic encroachment
Knowledge, conservatism, and pragmatics
Knowledge, intuition and implicature
Contextualism, Subject-Sensitive Invariantism and Knowledge of Knowledge
Knowledge and Conversation
Assertion, Practical Reason, and Pragmatic Theories of Knowledge
Practical Certainty
Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions
The Attitude of Knowledge
Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Thinking About Error
Pragmatics
| Citations per year | 0.67 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2026 (7) |
| Highly cited | No |