DAN-JOHAN EKLUND
Biographic Data
| ID | 9266463 |
|---|---|
| NAME | DAN-JOHAN EKLUND |
| GIVEN NAMES | DAN-JOHAN |
| FAMILY NAME | EKLUND |
| SIGNATURE | EKLUND D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Helsinki |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
E. J. Lowe on the modal ontological argument
E. J. Lowe has defended a modal ontological argument that draws upon Plantinga's version. Briefly, the argument is this: God is a necessary being; possibly, God exists; hence, God exists. In this article, I accept the validity of Lowe's modal ontological argument and focus on how he seeks to justify the argument's possibility claim in reference to his essence-based account of modal knowledge. I argue that here Lowe's defence fails. I have two com…
Is non-evidential believing possible? John Bishop on passionally caused beliefs
John Bishop and Andrei Buckareff have discussed in this journal Bishop's conception of faith, which he has later included in his Believing by Faith (2007). One key question concerned the possibility of believing on inconclusive evidence. Bishop suggested that beliefs may have non-evidential, passional causes that can sustain belief even if what is believed lacks adequate evidential support. Buckareff took a critical stance towards Bishop's claim.…
No prominent works on this page.
Is non-evidential believing possible? John Bishop on passionally caused beliefs
John Bishop and Andrei Buckareff have discussed in this journal Bishop's conception of faith, which he has later included in his Believing by Faith (2007). One key question concerned the possibility of believing on inconclusive evidence. Bishop suggested that beliefs may have non-evidential, passional causes that can sustain belief even if what is believed lacks adequate evidential support. Buckareff took a critical stance towards Bishop's claim.…
E. J. Lowe on the modal ontological argument
E. J. Lowe has defended a modal ontological argument that draws upon Plantinga's version. Briefly, the argument is this: God is a necessary being; possibly, God exists; hence, God exists. In this article, I accept the validity of Lowe's modal ontological argument and focus on how he seeks to justify the argument's possibility claim in reference to his essence-based account of modal knowledge. I argue that here Lowe's defence fails. I have two com…
Epistemology (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (2 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 work) · Criticism (1 work) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (1 work) · Faith (1 work) · Focus (optics) (1 work) · Law (1 work)