E. J. Lowe on the modal ontological argument
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20311473 |
|---|---|
| Authors | DAN-JOHAN EKLUND (University of Helsinki, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 56 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 611-622 |
| Publication date | 2020-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Religious Studies (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-4125 • E-ISSN: 1469-901X |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0034412519000131 |
| OpenAlex | W2922410774 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 12 |
E. J. Lowe has defended a modal ontological argument that draws upon Plantinga's version. Briefly, the argument is this: God is a necessary being; possibly, God exists; hence, God exists. In this article, I accept the validity of Lowe's modal ontological argument and focus on how he seeks to justify the argument's possibility claim in reference to his essence-based account of modal knowledge. I argue that here Lowe's defence fails. I have two complaints. I call them ‘the modified “perfect island” objection’ and ‘the conflicting possibilities objection’. Both of these refer to the concern that Lowe's modal epistemology is too permissive: it permits justification of possibility claims that question the acceptability of the underlying modal epistemology
Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Focus (optics) · Metaphysics · Modal · Ontological argument · Philosophy of religion · Physics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Theology and Philosophy of Evil
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2022 - 2023 (2) |
| Highly cited | No |