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Petar Bodlović

Biographic Data

ID9330739
NAMEPetar Bodlović
GIVEN NAMESPetar
FAMILY NAMEBodlović
SIGNATUREBODLOVIĆ P
AFFILIATIONSNOVA University of Lisbon
ORCID0000-0001-8430-2599
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS3
TOTAL CITATIONS0
AUTHOR COUNT3
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2021
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2025
H-INDEX0
  • Knowledge Versus Understanding

    Open Access•Petar Bodlović, Karolina Kudlek•ARTICLE•Ethical Theory and Moral Practice•2025

    Moral progress is often modeled as an increase in moral knowledge and understanding, with achievements in moral reasoning seen as key drivers of progressive moral change. Contemporary discussion recognizes two (rival) accounts: knowledge-based and understanding-based theories of moral progress, with the latter recently contended as superior (Severini 2021). In this article, we challenge the alleged superiority of understanding-based accounts by c…

  • On the strength of presumptions

    Open Access•Petar Bodlović•ARTICLE•Pragmatics & Cognition•2022

    Traditionally, a presumption is a dialogically privileged, yet defeasible proposition that allocates the burden of proof to a party who challenges it. This paper investigates the strength of presumptions. First, it explains how ‘strength’ contributes to defining the concept of presumption. Second, it provides an overview of (contextual, justificatory, and deontic) factors determining a presumption’s strength. Finally, it analyses the predominant …

  • On the Differences Between Practical and Cognitive Presumptions

    Open Access•Petar Bodlović•ARTICLE•Argumentation•2021

    The study of presumptions has intensified in argumentation theory over the last years. Although scholars put forward different accounts, they mostly agree that presumptions can be studied in deliberative and epistemic contexts, have distinct contextual functions (guiding decisions vs. acquiring information), and promote different kinds of goals (non-epistemic vs. epistemic). Accordingly, there are “practical” and “cognitive” presumptions. In this…

No prominent works on this page.

  • On the Differences Between Practical and Cognitive Presumptions

    Open Access•Petar Bodlović•ARTICLE•Argumentation•2021

    The study of presumptions has intensified in argumentation theory over the last years. Although scholars put forward different accounts, they mostly agree that presumptions can be studied in deliberative and epistemic contexts, have distinct contextual functions (guiding decisions vs. acquiring information), and promote different kinds of goals (non-epistemic vs. epistemic). Accordingly, there are “practical” and “cognitive” presumptions. In this…

  • On the strength of presumptions

    Open Access•Petar Bodlović•ARTICLE•Pragmatics & Cognition•2022

    Traditionally, a presumption is a dialogically privileged, yet defeasible proposition that allocates the burden of proof to a party who challenges it. This paper investigates the strength of presumptions. First, it explains how ‘strength’ contributes to defining the concept of presumption. Second, it provides an overview of (contextual, justificatory, and deontic) factors determining a presumption’s strength. Finally, it analyses the predominant …

  • Knowledge Versus Understanding

    Open Access•Petar Bodlović, Karolina Kudlek•ARTICLE•Ethical Theory and Moral Practice•2025

    Moral progress is often modeled as an increase in moral knowledge and understanding, with achievements in moral reasoning seen as key drivers of progressive moral change. Contemporary discussion recognizes two (rival) accounts: knowledge-based and understanding-based theories of moral progress, with the latter recently contended as superior (Severini 2021). In this article, we challenge the alleged superiority of understanding-based accounts by c…

Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works) · Argumentation theory (1 work) · Burden of proof (1 work) · Cognition (1 work) · Cognitive science (1 work) · Defeasible estate (1 work)

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