On the strength of presumptions

Bibliographic Data

ID20484395
AuthorsPetar Bodlović (0000-0001-8430-2599, NOVA University of Lisbon, corresponding author)
Year2022
Volume29
Issue1
Pages82-110
Publication date2022-12-31
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePragmatics & Cognition (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0929-0907 • E-ISSN: 1569-9943
PublisherJohn Benjamins Publishing Company (PUBLISHER • NL)
DOI10.1075/pc.21017.bod
OpenAlexW4319994918
LanguageEN
References cited36

Traditionally, a presumption is a dialogically privileged, yet defeasible proposition that allocates the burden of proof to a party who challenges it. This paper investigates the strength of presumptions. First, it explains how ‘strength’ contributes to defining the concept of presumption. Second, it provides an overview of (contextual, justificatory, and deontic) factors determining a presumption’s strength. Finally, it analyses the predominant view that defines strength in terms of the Challenger’s burden of proof: the stronger (weaker) the presumption p , the more (less) difficult it is to prove non- p . I argue that the latter proposal applies only to practical presumptions, and that strength is conceived differently for cognitive presumptions

Burden of proof · Defeasible estate · Defeasible reasoning · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Political science · Presumption · Proposition · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

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