Yamina Venuta
Biographic Data
| ID | 9407245 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Yamina Venuta |
| GIVEN NAMES | Yamina |
| FAMILY NAME | Venuta |
| SIGNATURE | VENUTA Y |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Cologne |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9607-8560 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Beyond Immediate Givenness
Merleau‐Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception (2012 [1945]) opens with a detailed critique of traditional philosophical accounts of sensation, generally understood as having Husserl's “content‐apprehension schema” among its targets. The schema sees perception as resulting from the interpretation (“apprehension” or “apperception”) of “raw” sensory contents (or “hyle”). Both the schema's plausibility and the extent of Husserl's later reliance on it r…
Beyond the mere present
My aim in this paper is to reconstruct Edmund Husserl’s views on the differences between human and animal consciousness, with particular attention to the experience of temporality. In the first section, I situate the topic of animal consciousness in the broader context of Husserl’s philosophy. Whereas this connection has been often neglected, I argue that a phenomenological analysis of non-human subjectivities is not only justified, but also esse…
No prominent works on this page.
Beyond the mere present
My aim in this paper is to reconstruct Edmund Husserl’s views on the differences between human and animal consciousness, with particular attention to the experience of temporality. In the first section, I situate the topic of animal consciousness in the broader context of Husserl’s philosophy. Whereas this connection has been often neglected, I argue that a phenomenological analysis of non-human subjectivities is not only justified, but also esse…
Beyond Immediate Givenness
Merleau‐Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception (2012 [1945]) opens with a detailed critique of traditional philosophical accounts of sensation, generally understood as having Husserl's “content‐apprehension schema” among its targets. The schema sees perception as resulting from the interpretation (“apprehension” or “apperception”) of “raw” sensory contents (or “hyle”). Both the schema's plausibility and the extent of Husserl's later reliance on it r…
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (2 works) · Consciousness (1 work) · Diversity and Impact of Dance (1 work) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (1 work) · Epistemology (1 work) · History (1 work) · Individuation (1 work) · Intentionality (1 work) · Perception (1 work) · Personhood (1 work)