John Dyck
Biographic Data
| ID | 9490606 |
|---|---|
| NAME | John Dyck |
| GIVEN NAMES | John |
| FAMILY NAME | Dyck |
| SIGNATURE | DYCK J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Department of Philosophy Auburn University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 3 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Simple Beauty
I argue that some simple things are aesthetically valuable, or beautiful. I give an account of simple beauty as beauty in simplicity. I then address some suspicions about simple beauty. Some people allege that simple beauty is at odds with aesthetic agency. In fact, I argue, simple beauty promotes certain kinds of aesthetic agency. Others allege that simple things do not warrant sustained appreciation. I argue that simple beauties present existen…
There Are No Purely Aesthetic Obligations
Do aesthetic reasons have normative authority over us? Could there be anything like an aesthetic ‘ought’ or an aesthetic obligation? I argue that there are no aesthetic obligations. We have reasons to act certain ways regarding various aesthetic objects – most notably, reasons to attend to and appreciate those objects. But, I argue, these reasons never amount to duties. This is because aesthetic reasons are merely evaluative, not deontic. They ca…
Appreciating Bad Art
There Are No Purely Aesthetic Obligations
Do aesthetic reasons have normative authority over us? Could there be anything like an aesthetic ‘ought’ or an aesthetic obligation? I argue that there are no aesthetic obligations. We have reasons to act certain ways regarding various aesthetic objects – most notably, reasons to attend to and appreciate those objects. But, I argue, these reasons never amount to duties. This is because aesthetic reasons are merely evaluative, not deontic. They ca…
Appreciating Bad Art
There Are No Purely Aesthetic Obligations
Do aesthetic reasons have normative authority over us? Could there be anything like an aesthetic ‘ought’ or an aesthetic obligation? I argue that there are no aesthetic obligations. We have reasons to act certain ways regarding various aesthetic objects – most notably, reasons to attend to and appreciate those objects. But, I argue, these reasons never amount to duties. This is because aesthetic reasons are merely evaluative, not deontic. They ca…
Simple Beauty
I argue that some simple things are aesthetically valuable, or beautiful. I give an account of simple beauty as beauty in simplicity. I then address some suspicions about simple beauty. Some people allege that simple beauty is at odds with aesthetic agency. In fact, I argue, simple beauty promotes certain kinds of aesthetic agency. Others allege that simple things do not warrant sustained appreciation. I argue that simple beauties present existen…
Beauty (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Law and economics (2 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis (1 works) · Aesthetics (1 works)