There Are No Purely Aesthetic Obligations

Bibliographic Data

ID8124706
AuthorsJason Dyck (0000-0003-1655-9952, Department of Philosophy Auburn University, corresponding author), John Dyck (Department of Philosophy Auburn University)
Year2021
Volume102
Issue4
Pages592-612
Publication date2021-02-27
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePacific philosophical quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0279-0750 • E-ISSN: 1468-0114
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/papq.12346
OpenAlexW3135078347
LanguageEN
Citations received12
References cited29

Do aesthetic reasons have normative authority over us? Could there be anything like an aesthetic ‘ought’ or an aesthetic obligation? I argue that there are no aesthetic obligations. We have reasons to act certain ways regarding various aesthetic objects – most notably, reasons to attend to and appreciate those objects. But, I argue, these reasons never amount to duties. This is because aesthetic reasons are merely evaluative, not deontic. They can only entice us or invite us – they can never compel us. Beauty gives us goods without shoulds

Aesthetics · Beauty · Deontic logic · Epistemology · Law and economics · Normative · Obligation · Political science · Sociology · Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Law · Philosophy

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