Alex Murphy
Biographic Data
| ID | 9490620 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alex Murphy |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alex |
| FAMILY NAME | Murphy |
| SIGNATURE | MURPHY A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University College London |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4084-0066 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Virtual Objects
The objects we interact with in virtual reality—virtual objects—raise metaphysical questions. The most central of these questions is whether virtual objects really exist, that is, whether we ought to be realists about such objects. The most prominent realist metaphysics of virtual objects is David Chalmers’ virtual digitalism—the view that virtual objects are digital objects. I propose an alternative realist account—virtual perceptibilism. On thi…
A Species‐Focused Approach to Assessing Speciesism
Speciesism, broadly understood as the view that species membership is a morally relevant property, has been a central topic of debate within animal ethics for around 50 years. However, in all this time, animal ethicists have paid relatively scant attention to the nature of species membership itself. This seems potentially regrettable, since species membership's precise nature is presumably highly pertinent to the question of its exact moral relev…
Exploring Temporal Sensitivity in the Brain Using Multi-timescale Language Models
The brain’s ability to perform complex computations at varying timescales is crucial, ranging from understanding single words to grasping the overarching narrative of a story. Recently, multi-timescale long short-term memory (MT-LSTM) models (Mahto et al. 2020; Jain et al. 2020) have been introduced, which use temporally tuned parameters to induce sensitivity to different timescales of language processing (i.e., related to near/distant words). Ho…
Chris Cowie, Morality and Epistemic Judgement, (OUP), 2019
Why Epistemic Reductionism Won’t Save the Moral Error Theorist
Moral error theorists often respond to the epistemic companions in guilt strategy by adopting the Disparity Response: reject the putative parity between moral and epistemic reasons and claim that though the former are irreducibly normative, the latter aren’t. I argue such a response fails. Expanding on Das’ Australas J Philos 95(1):58–69, (2017) work I present a master argument against Disparity Responses: the arguments moral error theorists use …
No prominent works on this page.
Why Epistemic Reductionism Won’t Save the Moral Error Theorist
Moral error theorists often respond to the epistemic companions in guilt strategy by adopting the Disparity Response: reject the putative parity between moral and epistemic reasons and claim that though the former are irreducibly normative, the latter aren’t. I argue such a response fails. Expanding on Das’ Australas J Philos 95(1):58–69, (2017) work I present a master argument against Disparity Responses: the arguments moral error theorists use …
Chris Cowie, Morality and Epistemic Judgement, (OUP), 2019
A Species‐Focused Approach to Assessing Speciesism
Speciesism, broadly understood as the view that species membership is a morally relevant property, has been a central topic of debate within animal ethics for around 50 years. However, in all this time, animal ethicists have paid relatively scant attention to the nature of species membership itself. This seems potentially regrettable, since species membership's precise nature is presumably highly pertinent to the question of its exact moral relev…
Exploring Temporal Sensitivity in the Brain Using Multi-timescale Language Models
The brain’s ability to perform complex computations at varying timescales is crucial, ranging from understanding single words to grasping the overarching narrative of a story. Recently, multi-timescale long short-term memory (MT-LSTM) models (Mahto et al. 2020; Jain et al. 2020) have been introduced, which use temporally tuned parameters to induce sensitivity to different timescales of language processing (i.e., related to near/distant words). Ho…
Virtual Objects
The objects we interact with in virtual reality—virtual objects—raise metaphysical questions. The most central of these questions is whether virtual objects really exist, that is, whether we ought to be realists about such objects. The most prominent realist metaphysics of virtual objects is David Chalmers’ virtual digitalism—the view that virtual objects are digital objects. I propose an alternative realist account—virtual perceptibilism. On thi…
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (2 works) · 3D Surveying and Cultural Heritage (1 works) · Algorithm (1 works) · Artificial Intelligence (1 works) · Augmented Reality Applications (1 works) · Cognitive Science and Mapping (1 works) · Decoding methods (1 works)