Virtual Objects

To Be is to Be Perceivable

Bibliographic Data

ID21293652
AuthorsAlex Murphy (0000-0003-4084-0066, University College London, corresponding author)
Year2025
Pages1-22
Publication date2025-07-30
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueAustralasian Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0004-8402 • E-ISSN: 1470-6828
PublisherInforma UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1080/00048402.2025.2521039
OpenAlexW4412773342
LanguageEN
References cited30

The objects we interact with in virtual reality—virtual objects—raise metaphysical questions. The most central of these questions is whether virtual objects really exist, that is, whether we ought to be realists about such objects. The most prominent realist metaphysics of virtual objects is David Chalmers’ virtual digitalism—the view that virtual objects are digital objects. I propose an alternative realist account—virtual perceptibilism. On this view virtual objects are pure perceptibilia. They are public objects, like rainbows, whose existence and intrinsic nature is dependent on us as perceivers. I contrast perceptibilism with digitalism, showing the superiority of the former. As such, I demonstrate that virtual perceptibilism is the best virtual realism on offer, leaving aside the question of whether perceptibilism is superior to irrealist accounts

Epistemology · 3D Surveying and Cultural Heritage · Augmented Reality Applications · Computer Science · Philosophy · Virtual Reality Applications and Impacts

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access