Dunja Šešelja
Biographic Data
| ID | 950762 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dunja Šešelja |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dunja |
| FAMILY NAME | Šešelja |
| SIGNATURE | ŠEŠELJA D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Eindhoven University of Technology |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5679-5787 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 17 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 79 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 17 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Pursuitworthiness in science
The Mix Matters: Exploring the Interplay Between Epistemic and Zetetic Norms in Scientific Disagreement
What is the rational response to a scientific disagreement? Many epistemologists argue that disagreement with an epistemic peer should generally lead to conciliation by lowering confidence in the disputed belief or even suspending judgment altogether. Although this conciliatory approach is widely regarded as a norm of individual rationality, its value in the context of collective scientific inquiry is less clear. Some have even raised concerns th…
An Agent-Based Model of MySide Bias in Scientific Debates
In this paper, we present an agent-based model for studying the impact of 'myside bias' on the argumentative dynamics in scientific communities. Recent insights in cognitive science suggest that scientific reasoning is influenced by `myside bias'. This bias manifests as a tendency to prioritize the search and generation of arguments that support one's views rather than arguments that undermine them. Additionally, individuals tend to apply more cr…
Scientific Disagreements and the Diagnosticity of Evidence: How Too Much Data May Lead to Polarization
Scientific disagreements sometimes persist even if scientists fully share results of their research. In this paper we develop an agent-based model to study the impact of diverging diagnostic values scientists may assign to the evidence, given their different background assumptions, on the emergence of polarization in the scientific community. Scientists are represented as Bayesian updaters for whom the diagnosticity of evidence is given by the Ba…
Scientific Disagreements, Fast Science and Higher-Order Evidence
Scientific disagreements are an important catalyst for scientific progress. But what happens when scientists disagree amid times of crisis, when we need quick yet reliable policy guidance? In this article, we provide a normative account for how scientists facing disagreement in the context of “fast science” should respond and how policy makers should evaluate such disagreement. Starting from an argumentative, pragma-dialectic account of scientifi…
Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms
Discussion of epistemic responsibility typically focuses on belief formation and actions leading to it. Similarly, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility have addressed the issue of collective belief formation and associated actions. However, there has been little discussion of collective responsibility for preventing epistemic harms, particularly those preventable only by the action of an unorganized group. We propose an account of coll…
Agent-based models of scientific interaction
The paper examines recent developments in agent-based modeling of scientific inquiry with a special focus on network epistemology. It provides a survey of different types of ABMs studying network effects in scientific inquiry: ABMs based on bandit problems, ABMs based on epistemic landscapes and ABMs based on argumentative dynamics. It further presents models that study the impact of biased and deceptive researchers on the success of collective i…
Rethinking the history of peptic ulcer disease and its relevance for network epistemology
The history of the research on peptic ulcer disease (PUD) is characterized by a premature abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis, which subsequently had its comeback, leading to the discovery of Helicobacter pylori-the major cause of the disease. In this paper we examine the received view on this case, according to which the primary reason for the abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis in the mid-twentieth century was a large-scale study by a p…
Some lessons from simulations of scientific disagreements
Formal Models of Scientific Inquiry in a Social Context: An Introduction
In Defence of Rationalist Accounts of the Continental Drift Debate: A Response to Pellegrini
What Is the Epistemic Function of Highly Idealized Agent-Based Models of Scientific Inquiry
In this paper we examine the epistemic value of highly idealized agent-based models (ABMs) of social aspects of scientific inquiry. On the one hand, we argue that taking the results of such simulations as informative of actual scientific inquiry is unwarranted, at least for the class of models proposed in recent literature. Moreover, we argue that a weaker approach, which takes these models as providing only “how-possibly” explanations, does not …
Robustness and Idealizations in Agent-Based Models of Scientific Interaction
The article presents an agent-based model (ABM) of scientific interaction aimed at examining how different degrees of connectedness of scientists impact their efficiency in knowledge acquisition. The model is built on the basis of Zollman’s ([2010]) ABM by changing some of its idealizing assumptions that concern the representation of the central notions underlying the model: epistemic success of the rivalling scientific theories, scientific inter…
Epistemic justification in the context of pursuit: A coherentist approach
Abstract argumentation and explanation applied to scientific debates
Rationality and irrationality in the history of continental drift: Was the hypothesis of continental drift worthy of pursuit
Kuhn and coherentist epistemology
Epistemic justification in the context of pursuit: A coherentist approach
Robustness and Idealizations in Agent-Based Models of Scientific Interaction
The article presents an agent-based model (ABM) of scientific interaction aimed at examining how different degrees of connectedness of scientists impact their efficiency in knowledge acquisition. The model is built on the basis of Zollman’s ([2010]) ABM by changing some of its idealizing assumptions that concern the representation of the central notions underlying the model: epistemic success of the rivalling scientific theories, scientific inter…
What Is the Epistemic Function of Highly Idealized Agent-Based Models of Scientific Inquiry
In this paper we examine the epistemic value of highly idealized agent-based models (ABMs) of social aspects of scientific inquiry. On the one hand, we argue that taking the results of such simulations as informative of actual scientific inquiry is unwarranted, at least for the class of models proposed in recent literature. Moreover, we argue that a weaker approach, which takes these models as providing only “how-possibly” explanations, does not …
Rationality and irrationality in the history of continental drift: Was the hypothesis of continental drift worthy of pursuit
Agent-based models of scientific interaction
The paper examines recent developments in agent-based modeling of scientific inquiry with a special focus on network epistemology. It provides a survey of different types of ABMs studying network effects in scientific inquiry: ABMs based on bandit problems, ABMs based on epistemic landscapes and ABMs based on argumentative dynamics. It further presents models that study the impact of biased and deceptive researchers on the success of collective i…
Scientific Disagreements, Fast Science and Higher-Order Evidence
Scientific disagreements are an important catalyst for scientific progress. But what happens when scientists disagree amid times of crisis, when we need quick yet reliable policy guidance? In this article, we provide a normative account for how scientists facing disagreement in the context of “fast science” should respond and how policy makers should evaluate such disagreement. Starting from an argumentative, pragma-dialectic account of scientifi…
Abstract argumentation and explanation applied to scientific debates
Some lessons from simulations of scientific disagreements
Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms
Discussion of epistemic responsibility typically focuses on belief formation and actions leading to it. Similarly, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility have addressed the issue of collective belief formation and associated actions. However, there has been little discussion of collective responsibility for preventing epistemic harms, particularly those preventable only by the action of an unorganized group. We propose an account of coll…
Kuhn and coherentist epistemology
Kuhn and coherentist epistemology
Rationality and irrationality in the history of continental drift: Was the hypothesis of continental drift worthy of pursuit
Abstract argumentation and explanation applied to scientific debates
Epistemic justification in the context of pursuit: A coherentist approach
What Is the Epistemic Function of Highly Idealized Agent-Based Models of Scientific Inquiry
In this paper we examine the epistemic value of highly idealized agent-based models (ABMs) of social aspects of scientific inquiry. On the one hand, we argue that taking the results of such simulations as informative of actual scientific inquiry is unwarranted, at least for the class of models proposed in recent literature. Moreover, we argue that a weaker approach, which takes these models as providing only “how-possibly” explanations, does not …
Robustness and Idealizations in Agent-Based Models of Scientific Interaction
The article presents an agent-based model (ABM) of scientific interaction aimed at examining how different degrees of connectedness of scientists impact their efficiency in knowledge acquisition. The model is built on the basis of Zollman’s ([2010]) ABM by changing some of its idealizing assumptions that concern the representation of the central notions underlying the model: epistemic success of the rivalling scientific theories, scientific inter…
Formal Models of Scientific Inquiry in a Social Context: An Introduction
In Defence of Rationalist Accounts of the Continental Drift Debate: A Response to Pellegrini
Rethinking the history of peptic ulcer disease and its relevance for network epistemology
The history of the research on peptic ulcer disease (PUD) is characterized by a premature abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis, which subsequently had its comeback, leading to the discovery of Helicobacter pylori-the major cause of the disease. In this paper we examine the received view on this case, according to which the primary reason for the abandonment of the bacterial hypothesis in the mid-twentieth century was a large-scale study by a p…
Some lessons from simulations of scientific disagreements
Agent-based models of scientific interaction
The paper examines recent developments in agent-based modeling of scientific inquiry with a special focus on network epistemology. It provides a survey of different types of ABMs studying network effects in scientific inquiry: ABMs based on bandit problems, ABMs based on epistemic landscapes and ABMs based on argumentative dynamics. It further presents models that study the impact of biased and deceptive researchers on the success of collective i…
Scientific Disagreements and the Diagnosticity of Evidence: How Too Much Data May Lead to Polarization
Scientific disagreements sometimes persist even if scientists fully share results of their research. In this paper we develop an agent-based model to study the impact of diverging diagnostic values scientists may assign to the evidence, given their different background assumptions, on the emergence of polarization in the scientific community. Scientists are represented as Bayesian updaters for whom the diagnosticity of evidence is given by the Ba…
Scientific Disagreements, Fast Science and Higher-Order Evidence
Scientific disagreements are an important catalyst for scientific progress. But what happens when scientists disagree amid times of crisis, when we need quick yet reliable policy guidance? In this article, we provide a normative account for how scientists facing disagreement in the context of “fast science” should respond and how policy makers should evaluate such disagreement. Starting from an argumentative, pragma-dialectic account of scientifi…
Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms
Discussion of epistemic responsibility typically focuses on belief formation and actions leading to it. Similarly, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility have addressed the issue of collective belief formation and associated actions. However, there has been little discussion of collective responsibility for preventing epistemic harms, particularly those preventable only by the action of an unorganized group. We propose an account of coll…
An Agent-Based Model of MySide Bias in Scientific Debates
In this paper, we present an agent-based model for studying the impact of 'myside bias' on the argumentative dynamics in scientific communities. Recent insights in cognitive science suggest that scientific reasoning is influenced by `myside bias'. This bias manifests as a tendency to prioritize the search and generation of arguments that support one's views rather than arguments that undermine them. Additionally, individuals tend to apply more cr…
The Mix Matters: Exploring the Interplay Between Epistemic and Zetetic Norms in Scientific Disagreement
What is the rational response to a scientific disagreement? Many epistemologists argue that disagreement with an epistemic peer should generally lead to conciliation by lowering confidence in the disputed belief or even suspending judgment altogether. Although this conciliatory approach is widely regarded as a norm of individual rationality, its value in the context of collective scientific inquiry is less clear. Some have even raised concerns th…
Pursuitworthiness in science
Epistemology (14 works) · Philosophy (14 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (10 works) · Philosophy of science (8 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Political science (7 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Sociology (6 works) · Law (5 works)