Jean-Jacques Laffont
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 951656 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Jean-Jacques Laffont |
| PRENOMES | Jean-Jacques |
| SOBRENOME | Laffont |
| ASSINATURA | LAFFONT J |
| AFILIAÇÕES | Institut Universitaire de France |
| VERIFICADO | Não |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 36 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 230 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 37 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1975 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2013 |
| ÍNDICE H | 7 |
Econometrics and Economic Theory in the 20th Century
The Theory of Incentives
Regulation and Development
In Regulation and Development Jean-Jacques Laffont provides the first theoretical analysis of regulation of public services for developing countries. He shows how the debate between price-cap regulation and cost of service regulation is affected by the characteristics of less developed countries (LDCs) and offers a positive theory of privatization that stresses the role of corruption. He develops a new theory of regulation with limited enforcemen…
On the Receiver Pays Principle
Downsizing with labor sharing and collusion
Collusion and group lending with adverse selection
Contracting for aid
The Theory of Incentives
Internet Interconnection and the Off-Net-Cost Pricing Principle
Group Contracting and Enforcement
We consider a principal-multiagent framework with adverse selection when contracting is possible ex ante. However, enforcement of contracts is imperfect, which results in inefficiencies. We study how group contracting may or may not mitigate those inefficiencies.
Separation of powers and development
Critique des procédures d'attribution des licences de téléphonie mobile
Competition and corruption in an agency relationship
Auctioning and Bargaining
This article considers a first-price sealed-bid auction at which the seller's reservation price is not announced in advance. We allow for a second round of bargaining and consider the Nash bargaining outcome when the object is unsold after the auctioning round. We characterize the bidders' and seller's Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies. The distributions of the buyers' and seller's private values are estimated by nonlinear least squares from a…
Privatisation et incitations
[eng] We discuss the application of the usual arguments in favor or against privatization, in the case of a natural monopoly. Then, we give two classical examples of trade-offs -public - private ownership - in specific contexts of contractual incompleteness. Finally, we sketch a theory of privatization based on political economy considerations. [fre] Nous discutons l'application des arguments habituels avancés dans les débats sur la privatisati…
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation
Journal Article A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Get access A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. By Laffont Qean-Jacques and Tirole Jean. (Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1993. Pp. xxii + 705. £24.95 hardback. ISBN 0 262 12174 3.) Mark Armstrong Mark Armstrong University of Southampton Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 105, Issue 428,…
Sur l'économie politique de la réglementation
Les théoriciens ont au cours de la dernière décennie mis au point les fondements d'une réglementation normative optimale. Se fondant sur l'exemple de la tarification d'une voie de communication, l'article montre qu'il faut aller plus loin et rechercher un arbitrage entre deux maux : l'inefficacité économique et l'arbitraire politique. Les modes tarifaires sophistiqués imaginés par la théorie laissent en effet plus de liberté au politique de les d…
Advances in Economic Theory
Journal Article Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Volume I Get access Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Volume I. Edited by LAFFONT (JEAN-JACQUES). (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pp. viii + 327. £35.00 hardback. ISBN 0 521 41666 3.)Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Volume II. Edited by LAF…
The Economics of Uncertainty and Information
The Economics of Uncertainty and Information may be used in conjunction with Loffont's Fundamentals of Economics in an advanced course in microeconomics. Both texts provide a thorough account of modern thinking on the subject and a wealth of carefully chosen examples and problems.The first four chapters of The Economics of Uncertainty and Information summarize the essential tools of the analysis of uncertainty and information: the theory of indiv…
Concurrence spatiale et distorsions de localisation en information incomplète
[eng] Spatial competition and distortuns of localization. Under incomplete information We study a model of spatial duopoly competition with sequential entry on a segment in the choice of locations (stage 1 of the game) and then simultaneous competition in delivery prices (stage 2). The second mover at stage one has incomplete information on the marginal cost (high or low) of the first mover. Hence, we obtain a signalling game in which there exist…
The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market
The authors study behavior of a large trader with private information about the mean of an asset with a risky return. They argue that if the variability of the return is not too great, typically the trader will find it desirable to ensure that the market price does not reveal his information, that is, that a "pooling" equilibrium arises. Such an equilibrium has the advantage of avoiding the incentive constraints that arise in "separating" equilib…
The Economics of Uncertainty and Information
Journal Article The Economics of Uncertainty and Information Get access The Economics of Uncertainty and Information. By JEAN-JACCHJES LAFFONT. (Cambridge, Mass., and London: The MIT Press, 1989. Pp. viii + 289. £24.75 hardback. ISBN o 262 121360.) John D. Hey John D. Hey University of York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 100, Issue 399, 1 March 1990, Pages 255–256, https://doi…
Test de l'hypothèse démocratique dans les décisions budgétaires communales
Test de l'hypothèse démocratique dans les décisions budgétaires communales Le financement des dépenses communales peut être, jusqu'en 1980, assimilé à une décision unidimensionnelle concernant le nombre de centimes.Cet article propose une modélisation de ce choix par la règle majoritaire qui résulte en le meilleur choix de l'agent médian dans une population où l'on a distingué ceux qui payent et ceux qui ne payent pas la taxe professionnelle.Le m…
Optimal taxation of a non-linear pricing monopolist
Comparative statics of the optimal dynamic incentive contract
A General Equilibrium Entrepreneurial Theory of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion
We construct a theory of competitive equilibrium under uncertainty using an entrepreneurial model with historical roots in the work of Knight in the 1920s. Individuals possess labor which they can supply as workers to a competitive labor market or use as entrepreneurs in running a firm. All entrepreneurs have access to the same risky technology and receive all profits from their firms. In the equilibrium, more risk averse individuals become worke…
Contracting for aid
Competition and corruption in an agency relationship
Incentives in Public Decision-Making
Journal Article Incentives in Public Decision-Making Get access Incentives in Public Decision-Making. By Jerry R. GREEN and JEAN-JACCHJES LAFFONT. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979. Pp. xviii + 293. $48.75, Dfl 100.00.) Peter J. Hammond Peter J. Hammond Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 90, Issue 358, 1 June 1980, Pages 407–408, https://doi.org/10.2307/2231809 P…
Separation of powers and development
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation
Journal Article A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Get access A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. By Laffont Qean-Jacques and Tirole Jean. (Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1993. Pp. xxii + 705. £24.95 hardback. ISBN 0 262 12174 3.) Mark Armstrong Mark Armstrong University of Southampton Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 105, Issue 428,…
Auctioning Incentive Contracts
This paper draws a remarkably simple bridge between auction theory and incentive theory. It considers the auctioning of an indivisible project among several fi rms. The firms have private information about their future cost at th e bidding stage, and the selected firm ex post invests in cost reduct ion. The authors show that (1) the optimal auction can be implemented by a dominant strategy auction that uses information about both the first bid an…
Macroeconomic Constraints, Economic Efficiency and Ethics
The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market
The authors study behavior of a large trader with private information about the mean of an asset with a risky return. They argue that if the variability of the return is not too great, typically the trader will find it desirable to ensure that the market price does not reveal his information, that is, that a "pooling" equilibrium arises. Such an equilibrium has the advantage of avoiding the incentive constraints that arise in "separating" equilib…
Imperfect personal information and the demand revealing process
Collusion and group lending with adverse selection
Toward a Normative Theory of Incentive Contracts Between Government and Private Firms
Journal Article Toward a Normative Theory of Incentive Contracts Between Government and Private Firms Get access Jean-Jacques Laffont Jean-Jacques Laffont Universite des sciences sociales and EHESS, Toulouse Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 97, Issue Supplement, 1 December 1987, Pages 17–31, https://doi.org/10.2307/3038227 Published: 01 December 1987
The Economics of Uncertainty and Information
Journal Article The Economics of Uncertainty and Information Get access The Economics of Uncertainty and Information. By JEAN-JACCHJES LAFFONT. (Cambridge, Mass., and London: The MIT Press, 1989. Pp. viii + 289. £24.75 hardback. ISBN o 262 121360.) John D. Hey John D. Hey University of York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 100, Issue 399, 1 March 1990, Pages 255–256, https://doi…
Privatisation et incitations
[eng] We discuss the application of the usual arguments in favor or against privatization, in the case of a natural monopoly. Then, we give two classical examples of trade-offs -public - private ownership - in specific contexts of contractual incompleteness. Finally, we sketch a theory of privatization based on political economy considerations. [fre] Nous discutons l'application des arguments habituels avancés dans les débats sur la privatisati…
La theorie economique de l'auto-protection
L'objet de cette note est de prendre en compte le phénomène d'autoprotection dans une théorie des assurances d'équilibre général.Après avoir mis en évidence la possibilité d'inexistence de l'équilibre concurrentiel et son inefficacité très générale, lorsqu'il existe, nous étudions des politiques économiques susceptibles de rétablir l'optimalité parétienne : prime variable liée à l'activité d'autoprotection, prime variable liée à la quantité d'ass…
Macroeconomic Constraints, Economic Efficiency and Ethics
La theorie economique de l'auto-protection
L'objet de cette note est de prendre en compte le phénomène d'autoprotection dans une théorie des assurances d'équilibre général.Après avoir mis en évidence la possibilité d'inexistence de l'équilibre concurrentiel et son inefficacité très générale, lorsqu'il existe, nous étudions des politiques économiques susceptibles de rétablir l'optimalité parétienne : prime variable liée à l'activité d'autoprotection, prime variable liée à la quantité d'ass…
Imperfect personal information and the demand revealing process
A General Equilibrium Entrepreneurial Theory of Firm Formation Based on Risk Aversion
We construct a theory of competitive equilibrium under uncertainty using an entrepreneurial model with historical roots in the work of Knight in the 1920s. Individuals possess labor which they can supply as workers to a competitive labor market or use as entrepreneurs in running a firm. All entrepreneurs have access to the same risky technology and receive all profits from their firms. In the equilibrium, more risk averse individuals become worke…
Incentives in Public Decision-Making
Journal Article Incentives in Public Decision-Making Get access Incentives in Public Decision-Making. By Jerry R. GREEN and JEAN-JACCHJES LAFFONT. (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979. Pp. xviii + 293. $48.75, Dfl 100.00.) Peter J. Hammond Peter J. Hammond Stanford University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 90, Issue 358, 1 June 1980, Pages 407–408, https://doi.org/10.2307/2231809 P…
Information imparfaite et économie publique
Une caractéristique essentielle des systèmes économiques est la décentralisation de l'information. Lorsqu'une décision collective doit être prise, le décideur social doit rassembler une information dont chaque agent possède des éléments qu'il est le seul à connaître. Par suite il se pose le problème du comportement stratégique vis-à-vis de cette information détenue de façon privative. Etant donné une fonction de choix social qui associe aux cara…
Information imparfaite et rationalité collective
Laffont Jean-Jacques. Information imparfaite et rationalité collective. In: Revue économique, volume 35, n°1, 1984. pp. 163-176
Large-Market Cournot Equilibria in Labour-Managed Economies
A basic point in the theory of labour-managed market economies is the fundamental role of free entry in order to achieve efficiency (see Dreze, 1974; Greenberg, 1979; Ichiishi, 1977; Meade, 1972, 1979; Vanek, 1970). But modelling a framework of firm selection process can be undertaken with different approaches. Dreze, Meade and Vanek, for example, consider a perfectly competitive process; Greenberg and Ichiishi build models of coalition formation…
Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
In a principal-agent model with adverse selection, we study the implementation of social choice functions when the agent's message space is a correspondence which depends on this true characteristic. We characterize such correspondence for which the Revelation Principle is valid
Optimal taxation of a non-linear pricing monopolist
Comparative statics of the optimal dynamic incentive contract
Le risque moral dans la relation de mandat
Le risque moral dans la relation de mandat Un bon partage des risques est une des conditions importantes que se doit de réaliser une organisation économique. Or l'aptitude qu'ont certains agents d'altérer les risques par des actions non observables par les autres parties que l'on a appelé un peu maladroitement problème de risque moral ou de hasard moral rend plus délicate la recherche de ce partage. L'objectif de cette note est de faire un tour d…
Auctioning Incentive Contracts
This paper draws a remarkably simple bridge between auction theory and incentive theory. It considers the auctioning of an indivisible project among several fi rms. The firms have private information about their future cost at th e bidding stage, and the selected firm ex post invests in cost reduct ion. The authors show that (1) the optimal auction can be implemented by a dominant strategy auction that uses information about both the first bid an…
Toward a Normative Theory of Incentive Contracts Between Government and Private Firms
Journal Article Toward a Normative Theory of Incentive Contracts Between Government and Private Firms Get access Jean-Jacques Laffont Jean-Jacques Laffont Universite des sciences sociales and EHESS, Toulouse Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 97, Issue Supplement, 1 December 1987, Pages 17–31, https://doi.org/10.2307/3038227 Published: 01 December 1987
Test de l'hypothèse démocratique dans les décisions budgétaires communales
Test de l'hypothèse démocratique dans les décisions budgétaires communales Le financement des dépenses communales peut être, jusqu'en 1980, assimilé à une décision unidimensionnelle concernant le nombre de centimes.Cet article propose une modélisation de ce choix par la règle majoritaire qui résulte en le meilleur choix de l'agent médian dans une population où l'on a distingué ceux qui payent et ceux qui ne payent pas la taxe professionnelle.Le m…
The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market
The authors study behavior of a large trader with private information about the mean of an asset with a risky return. They argue that if the variability of the return is not too great, typically the trader will find it desirable to ensure that the market price does not reveal his information, that is, that a "pooling" equilibrium arises. Such an equilibrium has the advantage of avoiding the incentive constraints that arise in "separating" equilib…
The Economics of Uncertainty and Information
Journal Article The Economics of Uncertainty and Information Get access The Economics of Uncertainty and Information. By JEAN-JACCHJES LAFFONT. (Cambridge, Mass., and London: The MIT Press, 1989. Pp. viii + 289. £24.75 hardback. ISBN o 262 121360.) John D. Hey John D. Hey University of York Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 100, Issue 399, 1 March 1990, Pages 255–256, https://doi…
Concurrence spatiale et distorsions de localisation en information incomplète
[eng] Spatial competition and distortuns of localization. Under incomplete information We study a model of spatial duopoly competition with sequential entry on a segment in the choice of locations (stage 1 of the game) and then simultaneous competition in delivery prices (stage 2). The second mover at stage one has incomplete information on the marginal cost (high or low) of the first mover. Hence, we obtain a signalling game in which there exist…
The Economics of Uncertainty and Information
The Economics of Uncertainty and Information may be used in conjunction with Loffont's Fundamentals of Economics in an advanced course in microeconomics. Both texts provide a thorough account of modern thinking on the subject and a wealth of carefully chosen examples and problems.The first four chapters of The Economics of Uncertainty and Information summarize the essential tools of the analysis of uncertainty and information: the theory of indiv…
Advances in Economic Theory
Journal Article Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Volume I Get access Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Volume I. Edited by LAFFONT (JEAN-JACQUES). (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Pp. viii + 327. £35.00 hardback. ISBN 0 521 41666 3.)Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress of the Econometric Society, Volume II. Edited by LAF…
A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation
Journal Article A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Get access A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. By Laffont Qean-Jacques and Tirole Jean. (Cambridge, Mass. and London: MIT Press, 1993. Pp. xxii + 705. £24.95 hardback. ISBN 0 262 12174 3.) Mark Armstrong Mark Armstrong University of Southampton Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 105, Issue 428,…
Sur l'économie politique de la réglementation
Les théoriciens ont au cours de la dernière décennie mis au point les fondements d'une réglementation normative optimale. Se fondant sur l'exemple de la tarification d'une voie de communication, l'article montre qu'il faut aller plus loin et rechercher un arbitrage entre deux maux : l'inefficacité économique et l'arbitraire politique. Les modes tarifaires sophistiqués imaginés par la théorie laissent en effet plus de liberté au politique de les d…
Privatisation et incitations
[eng] We discuss the application of the usual arguments in favor or against privatization, in the case of a natural monopoly. Then, we give two classical examples of trade-offs -public - private ownership - in specific contexts of contractual incompleteness. Finally, we sketch a theory of privatization based on political economy considerations. [fre] Nous discutons l'application des arguments habituels avancés dans les débats sur la privatisati…
Auctioning and Bargaining
This article considers a first-price sealed-bid auction at which the seller's reservation price is not announced in advance. We allow for a second round of bargaining and consider the Nash bargaining outcome when the object is unsold after the auctioning round. We characterize the bidders' and seller's Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies. The distributions of the buyers' and seller's private values are estimated by nonlinear least squares from a…
Competition and corruption in an agency relationship
Economics (28 obras) · Microeconomics (19 obras) · Political science (17 obras) · Computer Science (15 obras) · Economic theories and models (12 obras) · Philosophy (11 obras) · Business (10 obras) · Auction Theory and Applications (9 obras) · Incentive (9 obras) · Philosophy (9 obras)