Daniel Gregory
Biographic Data
| ID | 9518225 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel Gregory |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel |
| FAMILY NAME | Gregory |
| SIGNATURE | GREGORY D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Salzburg |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4059-6948 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1975 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
How not to decide whether inner speech is speech
Philosophical interest in inner speech has grown in recent years. In seeking to understand the phenomenon, many philosophers have drawn heavily on two theories from neighbouring disciplines: Lev Vygotsky’s theory on the development of inner speech in children and a cognitive-scientific theory about speech production. I argue that they have been too uncritical in their acceptance of these theories, which has prevented a proper analysis of inner sp…
Imagining a Way Out of Dream Skepticism
The problem of dream skepticism – i.e., the problem of what can justify one’s belief that they are not dreaming – is one of the most famous problems in philosophy. I propose a way of responding to the problem which is available if one subscribes to the theory that the sensory experiences that we have in dreams consist of images (as opposed to false percepts). The response exploits a particular feature of imagination, viz., that it is not possible…
Content determination in dreams supports the imagination theory
There are two leading theories about the ontology of dreams. One holds that dreams involve hallucinations and beliefs. The other holds that dreaming involves sensory and propositional imagining. I highlight two features of dreams which are more easily explained by the imagination theory. One is that certain things seem to be true in our dreams, even though they are not represented sensorily; this is easily explained if dreams involve propositiona…
Who knows what Mary knew? An experimental study
This paper reports the results of an experimental philosophy study of intuitions among members of the general US population regarding a version of Frank Jackson’s famous ‘Mary in the black and white room’ thought experiment. A large majority of respondents (82.1%, significantly above chance) reported having the intuition which is critical to the thought experiment, i.e., that Mary does not know what it is like to see red before she actually sees …
Manuela Semidei
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
No prominent works on this page.
Manuela Semidei
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Who knows what Mary knew? An experimental study
This paper reports the results of an experimental philosophy study of intuitions among members of the general US population regarding a version of Frank Jackson’s famous ‘Mary in the black and white room’ thought experiment. A large majority of respondents (82.1%, significantly above chance) reported having the intuition which is critical to the thought experiment, i.e., that Mary does not know what it is like to see red before she actually sees …
How not to decide whether inner speech is speech
Philosophical interest in inner speech has grown in recent years. In seeking to understand the phenomenon, many philosophers have drawn heavily on two theories from neighbouring disciplines: Lev Vygotsky’s theory on the development of inner speech in children and a cognitive-scientific theory about speech production. I argue that they have been too uncritical in their acceptance of these theories, which has prevented a proper analysis of inner sp…
Imagining a Way Out of Dream Skepticism
The problem of dream skepticism – i.e., the problem of what can justify one’s belief that they are not dreaming – is one of the most famous problems in philosophy. I propose a way of responding to the problem which is available if one subscribes to the theory that the sensory experiences that we have in dreams consist of images (as opposed to false percepts). The response exploits a particular feature of imagination, viz., that it is not possible…
Content determination in dreams supports the imagination theory
There are two leading theories about the ontology of dreams. One holds that dreams involve hallucinations and beliefs. The other holds that dreaming involves sensory and propositional imagining. I highlight two features of dreams which are more easily explained by the imagination theory. One is that certain things seem to be true in our dreams, even though they are not represented sensorily; this is easily explained if dreams involve propositiona…
Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Linguistics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works)