Content determination in dreams supports the imagination theory

Bibliographic Data

ID21370515
AuthorsDaniel Gregory (0000-0003-4059-6948, University of Salzburg, corresponding author)
Year2024
Volume181
Issue11
Pages3037-3057
Publication date2024-11-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Studies (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8116 • E-ISSN: 1573-0883
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11098-024-02250-3
OpenAlexW4404185947
LanguageEN
References cited23

There are two leading theories about the ontology of dreams. One holds that dreams involve hallucinations and beliefs. The other holds that dreaming involves sensory and propositional imagining. I highlight two features of dreams which are more easily explained by the imagination theory. One is that certain things seem to be true in our dreams, even though they are not represented sensorily; this is easily explained if dreams involve propositional imagining. The other is that dream narratives can be temporally segmented, involving events which take place across long spans of time; this makes sense if dreams involve sensory imagining, for we often sensorily imagine narratives during wakefulness in the same way. The two considerations are unified by the fact that both highlight forms of content determination characteristic of imagining

Content (measure theory) · Epistemology · Imagination · Metaphysics · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of mind · Mathematics · Paranormal Experiences and Beliefs · Philosophy · Sleep and Wakefulness Research

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