Peter V Forrest
Biographic Data
| ID | 9518253 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Peter V Forrest |
| GIVEN NAMES | Peter V |
| FAMILY NAME | Forrest |
| SIGNATURE | FORREST P V |
| AFFILIATIONS | Auburn University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4231-0464 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1982 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Is All Phenomenology Presentational
This paper is about two questions in contemporary philosophy of mind, which I call the Scope Question and the Marks Question. The Scope Question is this: What kinds of mental states (events or processes) have phenomenal character, and how many different kinds of phenomenal character are there? The Marks Question is this: What are the distinguishing “marks” of the phenomenal, in virtue of which a mental state, event, or process counts as being phe…
The limits of perceptual phenomenal content
Collective Guilt; Individual Shame
I start with a problem that has received some attention in the literature, and which usually arises in the context of serious past wrongs such as the genocide of the Tasmanians, various massacres, and the sustained attempt to destroy Aboriginal culture and language. (As an Australian I use Australian examples to avoid appearing to be censorious.) The problem is also of considerable importance in the philosophical understanding and evaluation of r…
Universals as Sense-data
God without the Supernatural
The Lehrer/Wagner theory of consensus and the zero weight problem
Occam’s Razor and Possible Worlds
Journal Article Occam's Razor and Possible Worlds Get access Peter Forrest Peter Forrest University of Sydney Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar The Monist, Volume 65, Issue 4, 1 October 1982, Pages 456–464, https://doi.org/10.5840/monist198265431 Published: 17 December 2014
Universals as Sense-data
The Lehrer/Wagner theory of consensus and the zero weight problem
Occam’s Razor and Possible Worlds
Journal Article Occam's Razor and Possible Worlds Get access Peter Forrest Peter Forrest University of Sydney Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar The Monist, Volume 65, Issue 4, 1 October 1982, Pages 456–464, https://doi.org/10.5840/monist198265431 Published: 17 December 2014
Occam’s Razor and Possible Worlds
Journal Article Occam's Razor and Possible Worlds Get access Peter Forrest Peter Forrest University of Sydney Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar The Monist, Volume 65, Issue 4, 1 October 1982, Pages 456–464, https://doi.org/10.5840/monist198265431 Published: 17 December 2014
The Lehrer/Wagner theory of consensus and the zero weight problem
God without the Supernatural
Universals as Sense-data
Collective Guilt; Individual Shame
I start with a problem that has received some attention in the literature, and which usually arises in the context of serious past wrongs such as the genocide of the Tasmanians, various massacres, and the sustained attempt to destroy Aboriginal culture and language. (As an Australian I use Australian examples to avoid appearing to be censorious.) The problem is also of considerable importance in the philosophical understanding and evaluation of r…
The limits of perceptual phenomenal content
Is All Phenomenology Presentational
This paper is about two questions in contemporary philosophy of mind, which I call the Scope Question and the Marks Question. The Scope Question is this: What kinds of mental states (events or processes) have phenomenal character, and how many different kinds of phenomenal character are there? The Marks Question is this: What are the distinguishing “marks” of the phenomenal, in virtue of which a mental state, event, or process counts as being phe…
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Mathematics (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Philosophy of mind (3 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Contemporary philosophy (2 works)