Is All Phenomenology Presentational
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 22109207 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Peter V Forrest (0000-0003-4231-0464, Auburn University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 8 |
| Issue | 0 |
| Publication date | 2022-12-28 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 2330-4014 • E-ISSN: 2330-4014 |
| Publisher | University of Michigan Library (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.3998/ergo.2242 |
| OpenAlex | W4313205242 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 16 |
This paper is about two questions in contemporary philosophy of mind, which I call the Scope Question and the Marks Question. The Scope Question is this: What kinds of mental states (events or processes) have phenomenal character, and how many different kinds of phenomenal character are there? The Marks Question is this: What are the distinguishing “marks” of the phenomenal, in virtue of which a mental state, event, or process counts as being phenomenally conscious? To make progress on these questions and explore the relationship between the two, I narrow my focus to a particular instance of each, viz. the (scope) question of whether thoughts possess their own phenomenal character and the (marks) question of whether all phenomenal character is presentational. First, I argue that a phenomenology of entertaining thought content, if it exists, is non-presentational. I then argue from the fact that every genuine phenomenal property can be thought about using a phenomenal concept, to the conclusion that all phenomenology is presentational. One implication is that a (standard form of) transparent, proprietary phenomenology of thought does not exist
Aesthetics · Epistemology · Presentational and representational acting · Computer Science · Mathematics · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Psychology
Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge
Thinking about Consciousness
Reference and Consciousness
Perception and the Fall from Eden
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief
Materialism and Qualia
What Is the Role of Consciousness in Demonstrative Thought?
The Epistemic View of Subjectivity
The limits of perceptual phenomenal content
Intentionalism and Perceptual Presence
Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness
The Spatial Content of Experience
Philosophical investigations
Perception and the Reach of Phenomenal Content
Gappiness and the Case for Liberalism about Phenomenal Properties
| Highly cited | No |
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