Christopher Willard-Kyle
Biographic Data
| ID | 958949 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Christopher Willard-Kyle |
| GIVEN NAMES | Christopher |
| FAMILY NAME | Willard-Kyle |
| SIGNATURE | WILLARD-KYLE C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Glasgow |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3783-1073 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Epistemic Cans
We argue that S is in a position to know that p iff S can know that p. Thus, what makes position‐to‐know‐ascriptions true is just a special case of what makes ability‐ascriptions true: compossibility. The novelty of our compossibility theory of epistemic modality lies in its subsuming epistemic modality under agentive modality, the modality characterizing what agents can do
Hedging and the Norm of Belief
We argue that knowledge is not the norm of belief given that ‘I believe’ is used to hedge. We explore the consequences of this argument for the normative relationship between belief and assertion
Trust, trustworthiness, and obligation
Where does entitlement to trust come from? When we trust someone to φ, do we need to have reason to trust them to φ or do we start out entitled to trust them to φ by default? Reductivists think that entitlement to trust always “reduces to” or is explained by the reasons that agents have to trust others. In contrast, anti-reductivists think that, in a broad range of circumstances, we just have entitlement to trust. even if we don’t have positive r…
Ignorance, soundness, and norms of inquiry
The current literature on norms of inquiry features two families of norms: norms that focus on an inquirer’s ignorance and norms that focus on the question’s soundness . I argue that, given a factive conception of ignorance, it’s possible to derive a soundness-style norm from a version of the ignorance norm. A crucial lemma in the argument is that just as one can only be ignorant of a proposition if the proposition is true, so one can only be ign…
Evoked questions and inquiring attitudes
Drawing inspiration from the notion of evocation employed in inferential erotetic logic, we defend an 'evoked questions norm' on inquiring attitudes. According to this norm, it is rational to have an inquiring attitude concerning a question only if that question is evoked by your background information. We offer two arguments for this norm. First, we develop an argument from convergence. Insights from several independent literatures (20th-century…
Valuable ignorance
A long line of epistemologists including Sosa (Epistemic explanations: a theory of telic normativity, and what it explains. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021), Feldman (The ethics of belief. Philos and Phenomenol Res 60:667–695, 2002), and Chisholm (Theory of knowledge, 2nd edn. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 2007) have argued that, at least for a certain class of questions that we take up, we should (or should aim to) close inquiry iff by …
The Knowledge Norm for Inquiry
A growing number of epistemologists have endorsed the Ignorance Norm for Inquiry. Roughly, this norm says that one should not inquire into a question unless one is ignorant of its answer. I argue that, in addition to ignorance, proper inquiry requires a certain kind of knowledge. Roughly, one should not inquire into a question unless one knows it has a true answer. I call this the Knowledge Norm for Inquiry. Proper inquiry walks a fine line, hold…
Abraham, Isaac, and the toxin
I argue that the story of God's commanding Abraham to sacrifice Isaac can be read as a variant of Kavka's (1983) Toxin Puzzle. On this reading, Abraham has no reason to kill Isaac, only reason to intend to kill Isaac. On one version of the Kavkan reading, it's impossible for Abraham, thus situated, to form the intention to kill Isaac. This would make the binding an impossible story: I explore the ethical and theological consequences of reading th…
P, but you don’t know that P
Unlike first-person Moorean sentences, it’s not always awkward to assert, “ p , but you don’t know that p .” This can seem puzzling: after all, one can never get one’s audience to know the asserted content by speaking thus. Nevertheless, such assertions can be conversationally useful, for instance, by helping speaker and addressee agree on where to disagree. I will argue that such assertions also make trouble for the growing family of views about…
Against the Doctrine of Infallibility
According to the doctrine of infallibility, one is permitted to believe p if one knows that necessarily, one would be right if one believed that p. This plausible principle-made famous in Descartes' cogito-is false. There are some self-fulfilling, higher-order propositions one can't be wrong about but shouldn't believe anyway: believing them would immediately make one's overall doxastic state worse
Being in a Position to Know is the Norm of Assertion
This paper defends a new norm of assertion: Assert that p only if you are in a position to know that p . We test the norm by judging its performance in explaining three phenomena that appear jointly inexplicable at first: Moorean paradoxes, lottery propositions, and selfless assertions. The norm succeeds by tethering unassertability to unknowability while untethering belief from assertion. The PtK‐norm foregrounds the public nature of assertion a…
Do great minds really think alike
Evoked questions and inquiring attitudes
Drawing inspiration from the notion of evocation employed in inferential erotetic logic, we defend an 'evoked questions norm' on inquiring attitudes. According to this norm, it is rational to have an inquiring attitude concerning a question only if that question is evoked by your background information. We offer two arguments for this norm. First, we develop an argument from convergence. Insights from several independent literatures (20th-century…
Against the Doctrine of Infallibility
According to the doctrine of infallibility, one is permitted to believe p if one knows that necessarily, one would be right if one believed that p. This plausible principle-made famous in Descartes' cogito-is false. There are some self-fulfilling, higher-order propositions one can't be wrong about but shouldn't believe anyway: believing them would immediately make one's overall doxastic state worse
Do great minds really think alike
Do great minds really think alike
Being in a Position to Know is the Norm of Assertion
This paper defends a new norm of assertion: Assert that p only if you are in a position to know that p . We test the norm by judging its performance in explaining three phenomena that appear jointly inexplicable at first: Moorean paradoxes, lottery propositions, and selfless assertions. The norm succeeds by tethering unassertability to unknowability while untethering belief from assertion. The PtK‐norm foregrounds the public nature of assertion a…
P, but you don’t know that P
Unlike first-person Moorean sentences, it’s not always awkward to assert, “ p , but you don’t know that p .” This can seem puzzling: after all, one can never get one’s audience to know the asserted content by speaking thus. Nevertheless, such assertions can be conversationally useful, for instance, by helping speaker and addressee agree on where to disagree. I will argue that such assertions also make trouble for the growing family of views about…
Against the Doctrine of Infallibility
According to the doctrine of infallibility, one is permitted to believe p if one knows that necessarily, one would be right if one believed that p. This plausible principle-made famous in Descartes' cogito-is false. There are some self-fulfilling, higher-order propositions one can't be wrong about but shouldn't believe anyway: believing them would immediately make one's overall doxastic state worse
Valuable ignorance
A long line of epistemologists including Sosa (Epistemic explanations: a theory of telic normativity, and what it explains. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021), Feldman (The ethics of belief. Philos and Phenomenol Res 60:667–695, 2002), and Chisholm (Theory of knowledge, 2nd edn. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 2007) have argued that, at least for a certain class of questions that we take up, we should (or should aim to) close inquiry iff by …
The Knowledge Norm for Inquiry
A growing number of epistemologists have endorsed the Ignorance Norm for Inquiry. Roughly, this norm says that one should not inquire into a question unless one is ignorant of its answer. I argue that, in addition to ignorance, proper inquiry requires a certain kind of knowledge. Roughly, one should not inquire into a question unless one knows it has a true answer. I call this the Knowledge Norm for Inquiry. Proper inquiry walks a fine line, hold…
Abraham, Isaac, and the toxin
I argue that the story of God's commanding Abraham to sacrifice Isaac can be read as a variant of Kavka's (1983) Toxin Puzzle. On this reading, Abraham has no reason to kill Isaac, only reason to intend to kill Isaac. On one version of the Kavkan reading, it's impossible for Abraham, thus situated, to form the intention to kill Isaac. This would make the binding an impossible story: I explore the ethical and theological consequences of reading th…
Trust, trustworthiness, and obligation
Where does entitlement to trust come from? When we trust someone to φ, do we need to have reason to trust them to φ or do we start out entitled to trust them to φ by default? Reductivists think that entitlement to trust always “reduces to” or is explained by the reasons that agents have to trust others. In contrast, anti-reductivists think that, in a broad range of circumstances, we just have entitlement to trust. even if we don’t have positive r…
Ignorance, soundness, and norms of inquiry
The current literature on norms of inquiry features two families of norms: norms that focus on an inquirer’s ignorance and norms that focus on the question’s soundness . I argue that, given a factive conception of ignorance, it’s possible to derive a soundness-style norm from a version of the ignorance norm. A crucial lemma in the argument is that just as one can only be ignorant of a proposition if the proposition is true, so one can only be ign…
Evoked questions and inquiring attitudes
Drawing inspiration from the notion of evocation employed in inferential erotetic logic, we defend an 'evoked questions norm' on inquiring attitudes. According to this norm, it is rational to have an inquiring attitude concerning a question only if that question is evoked by your background information. We offer two arguments for this norm. First, we develop an argument from convergence. Insights from several independent literatures (20th-century…
Hedging and the Norm of Belief
We argue that knowledge is not the norm of belief given that ‘I believe’ is used to hedge. We explore the consequences of this argument for the normative relationship between belief and assertion
Epistemic Cans
We argue that S is in a position to know that p iff S can know that p. Thus, what makes position‐to‐know‐ascriptions true is just a special case of what makes ability‐ascriptions true: compossibility. The novelty of our compossibility theory of epistemic modality lies in its subsuming epistemic modality under agentive modality, the modality characterizing what agents can do
Epistemology (11 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (11 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 works) · Ignorance (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Norm (philosophy) (4 works) · Philosophy of language (4 works) · Philosophy of science (4 works) · Psychology (4 works)