Against the Doctrine of Infallibility
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4352079 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Christopher Willard-Kyle (0000-0002-3783-1073, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 71 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Publication date | 2021-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqaa082 |
| OpenAlex | W3118170797 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 33 |
According to the doctrine of infallibility, one is permitted to believe p if one knows that necessarily, one would be right if one believed that p. This plausible principle-made famous in Descartes' cogito-is false. There are some self-fulfilling, higher-order propositions one can't be wrong about but shouldn't believe anyway: believing them would immediately make one's overall doxastic state worse
Cogito ergo sum · Doctrine · Doxastic logic · Economics · Epistemology · Infallibility · Order (exchange) · Theology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Knowledge in an Uncertain World
Tracking Truth
Direction of Fit
Epistemic Freedom
The Unity of the Epistemic Virtues
God and his imaginary friends
Knowledge in a Social World
The toxin puzzle
A Virtue Epistemology
The Possibility of Practical Reason
Unreasonable Knowledge
Doxastic permissiveness and the promise of truth
Do great minds really think alike
Epistemic freedom revisited
Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence
Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions
The Ubiquity of State-Given Reasons
Ways of Meaning
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,2 |
| Citation span | 2021 - 2021 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |