Juan Felipe Riaño
Biographic Data
| ID | 960971 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Juan Felipe Riaño |
| GIVEN NAMES | Juan Felipe |
| FAMILY NAME | Riaño |
| SIGNATURE | RIAÑO J F |
| AFFILIATIONS | Georgetown University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4909-4127 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 13 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
When the Bombs Stopped
Collateral Damage
We investigate the long-term impact of conflict on economic development, focusing on the US ‘Secret War’ in Laos (1964–73). Our study employs multiple empirical strategies and data on bombing campaigns, satellite imagery, and development indicators to demonstrate that regions heavily bombed during this period experienced lower economic development almost fifty years after the conflict officially ended. A one-standard-deviation increase in bombing…
Political Competition and State Capacity
We develop a model of the politics of state capacity building undertaken by incumbent parties that have a comparative advantage in clientelism rather than in public goods provision. The model predicts that, when challenged by opponents, clientelistic incumbents have the incentive to prevent investments in state capacity. We provide empirical support for the model’s implications by studying policy decisions by the Institutional Revolutionary Party…
Conflict, Educational Attainment, and Structural Transformation
We examine the long-term impact of violence on educational attainment, with evidence from Colombia’s La Violencia, a period of intense political violence in the mid-twentieth century. We find that individuals exposed to violence during and especially before their schooling years experience a significant and economically meaningful decrease in years of schooling. Exploring consequences beyond human capital accumulation, we show that exposed cohort…
Political Competition and State Capacity
We develop a model of the politics of state capacity building undertaken by incumbent parties that have a comparative advantage in clientelism rather than in public goods provision. The model predicts that, when challenged by opponents, clientelistic incumbents have the incentive to prevent investments in state capacity. We provide empirical support for the model’s implications by studying policy decisions by the Institutional Revolutionary Party…
Conflict, Educational Attainment, and Structural Transformation
We examine the long-term impact of violence on educational attainment, with evidence from Colombia’s La Violencia, a period of intense political violence in the mid-twentieth century. We find that individuals exposed to violence during and especially before their schooling years experience a significant and economically meaningful decrease in years of schooling. Exploring consequences beyond human capital accumulation, we show that exposed cohort…
Collateral Damage
We investigate the long-term impact of conflict on economic development, focusing on the US ‘Secret War’ in Laos (1964–73). Our study employs multiple empirical strategies and data on bombing campaigns, satellite imagery, and development indicators to demonstrate that regions heavily bombed during this period experienced lower economic development almost fifty years after the conflict officially ended. A one-standard-deviation increase in bombing…
Conflict, Educational Attainment, and Structural Transformation
We examine the long-term impact of violence on educational attainment, with evidence from Colombia’s La Violencia, a period of intense political violence in the mid-twentieth century. We find that individuals exposed to violence during and especially before their schooling years experience a significant and economically meaningful decrease in years of schooling. Exploring consequences beyond human capital accumulation, we show that exposed cohort…
Political Competition and State Capacity
We develop a model of the politics of state capacity building undertaken by incumbent parties that have a comparative advantage in clientelism rather than in public goods provision. The model predicts that, when challenged by opponents, clientelistic incumbents have the incentive to prevent investments in state capacity. We provide empirical support for the model’s implications by studying policy decisions by the Institutional Revolutionary Party…
Collateral Damage
We investigate the long-term impact of conflict on economic development, focusing on the US ‘Secret War’ in Laos (1964–73). Our study employs multiple empirical strategies and data on bombing campaigns, satellite imagery, and development indicators to demonstrate that regions heavily bombed during this period experienced lower economic development almost fifty years after the conflict officially ended. A one-standard-deviation increase in bombing…
When the Bombs Stopped
Political science (4 works) · Economics (2 works) · Southeast Asian Sociopolitical Studies (2 works) · Agricultural risk and resilience (1 work) · Armed conflict (1 work) · Cambodian History and Society (1 work) · Clientelism (1 work) · Collateral (1 work) · Collateral damage (1 work) · Competition (biology (1 work)