Markus Dressel
Biographic Data
| ID | 9616865 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Markus Dressel |
| GIVEN NAMES | Markus |
| FAMILY NAME | Dressel |
| SIGNATURE | DRESSEL M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Leibniz University Hannover |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4789-5249 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 2 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Models of science and society
What is the appropriate place for science in society? Despite the vast literature on the subject, the science–society relation remains a disputed issue. A major reason is that, when we are asking about the right place of science in society, we are actually asking a range of interrelated and hard-to-answer individual questions. These questions include the role of social values in the research process, the neutrality of science in policy, the inter…
Inductive risk
The argument from inductive risk is considered to be one of the strongest challenges for value-free science. A great part of its appeal lies in the idea that even an ideal epistemic agent—the “perfect scientist” or “scientist qua scientist”—cannot escape inductive risk. In this paper, I scrutinize this ambition by stipulating an idealized Bayesian decision setting. I argue that inductive risk does not show that the “perfect scientist” must, descr…
No prominent works on this page.
Models of science and society
What is the appropriate place for science in society? Despite the vast literature on the subject, the science–society relation remains a disputed issue. A major reason is that, when we are asking about the right place of science in society, we are actually asking a range of interrelated and hard-to-answer individual questions. These questions include the role of social values in the research process, the neutrality of science in policy, the inter…
Inductive risk
The argument from inductive risk is considered to be one of the strongest challenges for value-free science. A great part of its appeal lies in the idea that even an ideal epistemic agent—the “perfect scientist” or “scientist qua scientist”—cannot escape inductive risk. In this paper, I scrutinize this ambition by stipulating an idealized Bayesian decision setting. I argue that inductive risk does not show that the “perfect scientist” must, descr…
Computer Science (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Appeal (1 works) · Climate Change Communication and Perception (1 works) · Conceptualization (1 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (1 works) · Heuristics (1 works) · Inductive reasoning (1 works) · Interdisciplinary Research and Collaboration (1 works)