Inductive risk
Does it really refute value-freedom
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21549506 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Markus Dressel (0000-0002-4789-5249, Leibniz University Hannover, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2022 |
| Volume | 37 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 181-207 |
| Publication date | 2022-06-30 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | THEORIA An International Journal for Theory History and Foundations of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0495-4548 • E-ISSN: 2171-679X |
| Publisher | EHU Press (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1387/theoria.22795 |
| OpenAlex | W4284881692 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 37 |
The argument from inductive risk is considered to be one of the strongest challenges for value-free science. A great part of its appeal lies in the idea that even an ideal epistemic agent—the “perfect scientist” or “scientist qua scientist”—cannot escape inductive risk. In this paper, I scrutinize this ambition by stipulating an idealized Bayesian decision setting. I argue that inductive risk does not show that the “perfect scientist” must, descriptively speaking, make non-epistemic value-judgements, at least not in a way that undermines the value-free ideal. However, the argument is more successful in showing that there are cases where the “perfect scientist” should, normatively speaking, use non-epistemic values. I also show that this is possible without creating problems of illegitimate prescription and wishful thinking. Thus, while inductive risk does not refute value-freedom completely, it still represents a powerful critique of value-free science
Appeal · Epistemology · Inductive reasoning · Political science · Wishful thinking · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology
The methodology of the social sciences
Experience and prediction
The Debate on Probable Opinions in the Scholastic Tradition
Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal
Science, Truth, and Democracy
In defence of the value free ideal
Distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate values in climate modeling
Moving beyond the linear model of expertise? IPCC and the test of adaptation
Science in a Democratic Society
Science as Social Knowledge
The science of statistics versus data science
Black Reconstruction in America
The Climate Change Challenge and the Failure of Democracy
Accepting an Epistemically Inferior Alternative? A Comment on Elliott and McKaughan
Cartography of pathways
Inductive risk and the contexts of communication
Turns in the evolution of the problem of induction
Du Bois’ democratic defence of the value free ideal
Bias and values in scientific research
Douglas on values
Values and uncertainties in climate prediction, revisited
State of the field
The new demarcation problem
The irreducibility of value-freedom to theory assessment
Science, truth and dictatorship
Epistemic Values and the Argument from Inductive Risk
Inductive Risk and Values in Science
The Risk of Using Inductive Risk to Challenge the Value-Free Ideal
Values in Science beyond Underdetermination and Inductive Risk
The Scientist qua Policy Advisor Makes Value Judgments
Feminism, Underdetermination, and Values in Science
Nonepistemic Values and the Multiple Goals of Science
The Moralistic Fallacy
Epistemic Trust in Science
Science in Democracy
The coming of environmental authoritarianism
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |