David Mathers
Biographic Data
| ID | 9637164 |
|---|---|
| NAME | David Mathers |
| GIVEN NAMES | David |
| FAMILY NAME | Mathers |
| SIGNATURE | MATHERS D |
| AFFILIATIONS | Moscow State University of Technologies and Management named after K.G. Razumovskiy |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4298-3458 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Against Sethi’s response to the Argument from Hallucination
Sethi (2020) attempts to show that even if we keep Price’s intuition: the claim that having an experience as of an F make us aware of an instance of Fness, we can still block the Argument from Hallucination, and so reject the conclusion that we are aware of mind-dependent rather than mind-independent items when we undergo successful perceptions. In an attempt to demonstrate this, she formulates the Argument from Hallucination so that it relies on…
Against Block on attention and mental paint
In two papers, Ned Block has argued that representationalists have trouble with the empirical discovery that differences in the degree of visual attention to an object can lead to a difference in how the object looks. I here respond on behalf of the representationalist. Against the argument of Block, I give a “companions-in-guilt” argument that the dilemma Block claims to find for the representationalist will, in fact, arise for anyone who accept…
No prominent works on this page.
Against Block on attention and mental paint
In two papers, Ned Block has argued that representationalists have trouble with the empirical discovery that differences in the degree of visual attention to an object can lead to a difference in how the object looks. I here respond on behalf of the representationalist. Against the argument of Block, I give a “companions-in-guilt” argument that the dilemma Block claims to find for the representationalist will, in fact, arise for anyone who accept…
Against Sethi’s response to the Argument from Hallucination
Sethi (2020) attempts to show that even if we keep Price’s intuition: the claim that having an experience as of an F make us aware of an instance of Fness, we can still block the Argument from Hallucination, and so reject the conclusion that we are aware of mind-dependent rather than mind-independent items when we undergo successful perceptions. In an attempt to demonstrate this, she formulates the Argument from Hallucination so that it relies on…
Cognitive psychology (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Perception (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis (1 work) · Chemistry (1 work) · Cognitive science (1 work) · Dilemma (1 work) · Direct and indirect realism (1 work)