Against Block on attention and mental paint
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21591959 |
|---|---|
| Authors | David Mathers (0000-0003-4298-3458, Moscow State University of Technologies and Management named after K.G. Razumovskiy, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 33 |
| Issue | 8 |
| Pages | 1121-1140 |
| Publication date | 2020-11-16 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophical Psychology (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0951-5089 • E-ISSN: 1465-394X |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/09515089.2020.1775797 |
| OpenAlex | W3034415028 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 13 |
In two papers, Ned Block has argued that representationalists have trouble with the empirical discovery that differences in the degree of visual attention to an object can lead to a difference in how the object looks. I here respond on behalf of the representationalist. Against the argument of Block, I give a “companions-in-guilt” argument that the dilemma Block claims to find for the representationalist will, in fact, arise for anyone who accepts that attention can alter appearance in the described manner. I conclude that the facts about attention’s effects on appearance give no specific reason to reject representationalism alone. Meanwhile, I argue that Block fails to adequately motivate a key claim, the ‘phenomenal precision principle’ upon which he relies. I conclude that the representationalist has nothing to fear from
Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Dilemma · Direct and indirect realism · Epistemology · Linguistics · Nothing · Perception · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis · Chemistry · Mathematics · Olfactory and Sensory Function Studies · Philosophy · Psychology · Visual perception and processing mechanisms
| Citations per year | 0.5 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2024 - 2024 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |