Lupita Estefania Gazzo Castañeda
Biographic Data
| ID | 9695384 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Lupita Estefania Gazzo Castañeda |
| GIVEN NAMES | Lupita Estefania Gazzo |
| FAMILY NAME | Castañeda |
| SIGNATURE | CASTAÑEDA L E G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of Giessen, Giessen, Germany |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
When nomenclature matters
For most of its history, the psychology of reasoning was dominated by binary extensional logic. The so-called “new paradigm” instead puts subjective degrees of belief center stage, often represented as probabilities. We argue that the “new paradigm” is too vaguely defined and therefore does not allow a clear decision about what falls within its scope and what does not. We also show that there was not one settled theoretical “old” paradigm, before…
How are beliefs represented in the mind
The commentators of our target article present several detailed arguments to refute the opposing theory. The real issue, however, seems to be the fundamental question of how the mind represents the content of beliefs. We distinguish between qualitative, quantitative and comparative approaches to modeling uncertain beliefs. We describe which theory falls into which of these classes. We also argue that the comparative level is the most fundamental,…
Everyday reasoning with unfamiliar conditionals
Probabilistic theories of reasoning assume that people use their prior knowledge to estimate the conditional probability of q given p and that this probability predicts the acceptance of modus ponens inferences. But how do people reason with unfamiliar conditionals for which they do not have prior knowledge? Reasoning without prior knowledge has been extensively investigated in experiments in which participants were instructed to reason deductive…
No prominent works on this page.
Everyday reasoning with unfamiliar conditionals
Probabilistic theories of reasoning assume that people use their prior knowledge to estimate the conditional probability of q given p and that this probability predicts the acceptance of modus ponens inferences. But how do people reason with unfamiliar conditionals for which they do not have prior knowledge? Reasoning without prior knowledge has been extensively investigated in experiments in which participants were instructed to reason deductive…
When nomenclature matters
For most of its history, the psychology of reasoning was dominated by binary extensional logic. The so-called “new paradigm” instead puts subjective degrees of belief center stage, often represented as probabilities. We argue that the “new paradigm” is too vaguely defined and therefore does not allow a clear decision about what falls within its scope and what does not. We also show that there was not one settled theoretical “old” paradigm, before…
How are beliefs represented in the mind
The commentators of our target article present several detailed arguments to refute the opposing theory. The real issue, however, seems to be the fundamental question of how the mind represents the content of beliefs. We distinguish between qualitative, quantitative and comparative approaches to modeling uncertain beliefs. We describe which theory falls into which of these classes. We also argue that the comparative level is the most fundamental,…
Cognitive psychology (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Child and Animal Learning Development (2 works) · Cognition (2 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works)