How are beliefs represented in the mind
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 21689092 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Markus Knauff (Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of Giessen, Giessen, Germany, corresponding author), Lupita Estefania Gazzo Castañeda (Experimental Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of Giessen, Giessen, Germany) |
| Year | 2023 |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 416-426 |
| Publication date | 2023-07-03 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Thinking & Reasoning (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1354-6783 • E-ISSN: 1464-0708 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/13546783.2023.2223110 |
| OpenAlex | W4381857225 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 44 |
The commentators of our target article present several detailed arguments to refute the opposing theory. The real issue, however, seems to be the fundamental question of how the mind represents the content of beliefs. We distinguish between qualitative, quantitative and comparative approaches to modeling uncertain beliefs. We describe which theory falls into which of these classes. We also argue that the comparative level is the most fundamental, and challenge commentators to justify why they think that beliefs have more or less structure in the human mind than can be captured at the comparative level
Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Epistemology · Theory of mind · Cultural Differences and Values · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
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If
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| Highly cited | No |
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