Berit Brogaard
Biographic Data
| ID | 970496 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Berit Brogaard |
| GIVEN NAMES | Berit |
| FAMILY NAME | Brogaard |
| SIGNATURE | BROGAARD B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Miami |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8712-0897 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 32 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 89 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 31 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1999 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Rethinking the credal basis of rational judgment and suspension: A non-Bayesian threshold view
In Epistemic Explanations , Ernest Sosa invokes a classical normative threshold account of rational judgment and suspension, according to which it is rational to judge that P iff one has a sufficiently high credence in P, and rational to suspend judgment about P iff one has a middling credence in P. I argue that threshold views of this kind face serious problems traceable to their foundation in classical probability theory. Moreover, I argue, the…
The rational roles of experiences of utterance meanings
The perennial question of the nature of natural-language understanding has received renewed attention in recent years. Two kinds of natural-language understanding, in particular, have captivated the interest of philosophers: linguistic understanding and utterance understanding. While the literature is rife with discussions of linguistic understanding and utterance understanding, the question of how the two types of understanding explanatorily dep…
Précis of Seeing and Saying
Replies to Alex Byrne, Mike Martin, and Nico Orlandi
Moral Partiality and Duties of Love
In this paper, I make a case for the view that we have special relationship duties (also known as “associative duties”) that are not identical to or derived from our non-associative impartial moral obligations. I call this view “moral partialism”. On the version of moral partialism I defend, only loving relationships can normatively ground special relationship duties. I propose that for two capable adults to have a loving relationship, they must …
Dogmatism and Ampliative Inference
The evidential role of experience in justifying beliefs has been at the center of debate in philosophy in recent years. One view is that experience, or seeming, can confer immediate (defeasible) justification on belief in virtue of its representational phenomenology. Call this view “representational dogmatism.” Another view is that experience confers immediate justification on belief in virtue of its relational phenomenology. Call this view “rela…
Implicit biases in visually guided action
Consciousness and information integration
Romantic Love for a Reason
In contemporary and historical contributions to the philosophy of love there has been considerable resistance to three claims concerning romantic love: (1) Romantic love is assessable for rationality, (2) romantic love is love for a reason, and (3) romantic love is reason-responsive. This chapter argues that these three ideas are intimately tied together. It offers justification for all three claims on the basis of more general considerations of …
The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds
Hatred: Understanding Our Most Dangerous Emotion
In defense of hearing meanings
The Publicity of Meaning and the Perceptual Approach to Speech Comprehension
The paper presents a number of empirical arguments for the perceptual view of speech comprehension. It then argues that a particular version of phenomenal dogmatism can confer immediate justification upon belief. In combination, these two views can bypass Davidsonian skepticism toward knowledge of meanings. The perceptual view alone, however, can bypass a variation on the Davidsonian argument. One reason Davidson thought meanings were not truly g…
Seeing Things
Ignorance and Incompetence: Linguistic Considerations
Type 2 blindsight and the nature of visual experience
The Phenomenal Use of 'Look' and Perceptual Representation
The article provides the state of the art on the debate about whether the semantics of 'look' statements commits us to any particular theory of perceptual experience. The debate began with Frank Jackson's argument that 'look' statements commit us to a sense-datum theory of perception. Thinkers from different camps have since then offered various rejoinders to Jackson's argument. Others have provided novel arguments from considerations of the sema…
Do we perceive natural kind properties?
Remarks on counterpossibles
Non-visual consciousness and visual images in blindsight
Are there unconscious perceptual processes
Introduction to Relative Truth
What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge‐ wh
Reductionists about knowledge‐ wh hold that “ s knows‐ wh ” (e.g. “John knows who stole his car”) is reducible to “there is a proposition p such that s knows that p , and p answers the indirect question of the wh ‐clause.” Anti‐reductionists hold that “ s knows‐ wh ” is reducible to “ s knows that p , as the true answer to the indirect question of the wh ‐clause.” I argue that both of these positions are defective. I then offer a new analysis of …
Attitude Reports: Do You Mind the Gap
Attitude reports are reports about people's states of mind. They are reports about what people think, believe, know, know a priori, imagine, hate, wish, fear, and the like. So, for example, I might report that s knows p, or that she imagines p, or that she hates p, where p specifies the content to which s is purportedly related. One lively current debate centers around the question of what sort of specification is involved when such attitude repo…
Sea Battle Semantics
Journal Article Sea Battle Semantics Get access Berit Brogaard Berit Brogaard University of Missouri–St Louis Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 58, Issue 231, April 2008, Pages 326–335, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.515.x Published: 18 May 2007
Remarks on counterpossibles
Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism
Moral relativism provides a compelling explanation of linguistic data involving ordinary moral expressions like ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. But it is a very radical view. Because relativism relativizes sentence truth to contexts of assessment it forces us to revise standard linguistic theory. If, however, no competing theory explains all of the evidence, perhaps it is time for a paradigm shift. However, I argue that a version of moral contextualism can …
What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge‐ wh
Reductionists about knowledge‐ wh hold that “ s knows‐ wh ” (e.g. “John knows who stole his car”) is reducible to “there is a proposition p such that s knows that p , and p answers the indirect question of the wh ‐clause.” Anti‐reductionists hold that “ s knows‐ wh ” is reducible to “ s knows that p , as the true answer to the indirect question of the wh ‐clause.” I argue that both of these positions are defective. I then offer a new analysis of …
In defense of hearing meanings
Sea Battle Semantics
Journal Article Sea Battle Semantics Get access Berit Brogaard Berit Brogaard University of Missouri–St Louis Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 58, Issue 231, April 2008, Pages 326–335, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.515.x Published: 18 May 2007
The Phenomenal Use of 'Look' and Perceptual Representation
The article provides the state of the art on the debate about whether the semantics of 'look' statements commits us to any particular theory of perceptual experience. The debate began with Frank Jackson's argument that 'look' statements commit us to a sense-datum theory of perception. Thinkers from different camps have since then offered various rejoinders to Jackson's argument. Others have provided novel arguments from considerations of the sema…
Number Words and Ontological Commitment
With the aid of some results from current linguistic theory, I examine a recent anti‐Fregean line with respect to hybrid talk of numbers and ordinary things, such as ‘The number of moons of Jupiter is four’. I conclude that the anti‐Fregean line with respect to these sentences is indefensible
Two Modal–isms: Fictionalism and Ersatzism
Attitude Reports: Do You Mind the Gap
Attitude reports are reports about people's states of mind. They are reports about what people think, believe, know, know a priori, imagine, hate, wish, fear, and the like. So, for example, I might report that s knows p, or that she imagines p, or that she hates p, where p specifies the content to which s is purportedly related. One lively current debate centers around the question of what sort of specification is involved when such attitude repo…
Replies to Alex Byrne, Mike Martin, and Nico Orlandi
A Puzzle about Properties
The paper argues that the assumption that there are property designators, together with two theoretically innocent claims, leads to a puzzle, whose solution requires us to reject the position that all (canonical) property designators are rigid. But if we deny that all (canonical) property designators are rigid, then the natural next step is to reject an abundant conception of properties and with it the suggestion that properties are the semantic …
Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Gettier Problem
A Peircean Theory of Decision
Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Gettier Problem
Two Modal–isms: Fictionalism and Ersatzism
The ‘Gray’s Elegy’ Argument, and The Prospects for the Theory of Denoting Concepts
A Puzzle about Properties
The paper argues that the assumption that there are property designators, together with two theoretically innocent claims, leads to a puzzle, whose solution requires us to reject the position that all (canonical) property designators are rigid. But if we deny that all (canonical) property designators are rigid, then the natural next step is to reject an abundant conception of properties and with it the suggestion that properties are the semantic …
Number Words and Ontological Commitment
With the aid of some results from current linguistic theory, I examine a recent anti‐Fregean line with respect to hybrid talk of numbers and ordinary things, such as ‘The number of moons of Jupiter is four’. I conclude that the anti‐Fregean line with respect to these sentences is indefensible
Attitude Reports: Do You Mind the Gap
Attitude reports are reports about people's states of mind. They are reports about what people think, believe, know, know a priori, imagine, hate, wish, fear, and the like. So, for example, I might report that s knows p, or that she imagines p, or that she hates p, where p specifies the content to which s is purportedly related. One lively current debate centers around the question of what sort of specification is involved when such attitude repo…
Sea Battle Semantics
Journal Article Sea Battle Semantics Get access Berit Brogaard Berit Brogaard University of Missouri–St Louis Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 58, Issue 231, April 2008, Pages 326–335, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.515.x Published: 18 May 2007
Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism
Moral relativism provides a compelling explanation of linguistic data involving ordinary moral expressions like ‘right’ and ‘wrong’. But it is a very radical view. Because relativism relativizes sentence truth to contexts of assessment it forces us to revise standard linguistic theory. If, however, no competing theory explains all of the evidence, perhaps it is time for a paradigm shift. However, I argue that a version of moral contextualism can …
Introduction to Relative Truth
What Mary Did Yesterday: Reflections on Knowledge‐ wh
Reductionists about knowledge‐ wh hold that “ s knows‐ wh ” (e.g. “John knows who stole his car”) is reducible to “there is a proposition p such that s knows that p , and p answers the indirect question of the wh ‐clause.” Anti‐reductionists hold that “ s knows‐ wh ” is reducible to “ s knows that p , as the true answer to the indirect question of the wh ‐clause.” I argue that both of these positions are defective. I then offer a new analysis of …
Are there unconscious perceptual processes
Non-visual consciousness and visual images in blindsight
Do we perceive natural kind properties?
Remarks on counterpossibles
The Phenomenal Use of 'Look' and Perceptual Representation
The article provides the state of the art on the debate about whether the semantics of 'look' statements commits us to any particular theory of perceptual experience. The debate began with Frank Jackson's argument that 'look' statements commit us to a sense-datum theory of perception. Thinkers from different camps have since then offered various rejoinders to Jackson's argument. Others have provided novel arguments from considerations of the sema…
Type 2 blindsight and the nature of visual experience
Ignorance and Incompetence: Linguistic Considerations
The Publicity of Meaning and the Perceptual Approach to Speech Comprehension
The paper presents a number of empirical arguments for the perceptual view of speech comprehension. It then argues that a particular version of phenomenal dogmatism can confer immediate justification upon belief. In combination, these two views can bypass Davidsonian skepticism toward knowledge of meanings. The perceptual view alone, however, can bypass a variation on the Davidsonian argument. One reason Davidson thought meanings were not truly g…
Seeing Things
In defense of hearing meanings
Romantic Love for a Reason
In contemporary and historical contributions to the philosophy of love there has been considerable resistance to three claims concerning romantic love: (1) Romantic love is assessable for rationality, (2) romantic love is love for a reason, and (3) romantic love is reason-responsive. This chapter argues that these three ideas are intimately tied together. It offers justification for all three claims on the basis of more general considerations of …
The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds
Hatred: Understanding Our Most Dangerous Emotion
Dogmatism and Ampliative Inference
The evidential role of experience in justifying beliefs has been at the center of debate in philosophy in recent years. One view is that experience, or seeming, can confer immediate (defeasible) justification on belief in virtue of its representational phenomenology. Call this view “representational dogmatism.” Another view is that experience confers immediate justification on belief in virtue of its relational phenomenology. Call this view “rela…
Philosophy (24 works) · Epistemology (21 works) · Psychology (19 works) · Computer Science (12 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (10 works) · Linguistics (9 works) · Metaphysics (9 works) · Philosophy of language (9 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 works) · Cognitive psychology (7 works)