The Publicity of Meaning and the Perceptual Approach to Speech Comprehension

Bibliographic Data

ID19475680
AuthorsBerit Brogaard (0000-0001-8712-0897, corresponding author), ProtoSociology Project
Year2017
Volume34
Pages144-162
Publication date2017-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueProtoSociology (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1434-4319
PublisherPhilosophy Documentation Center (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.5840/protosociology2017349
OpenAlexW2780414988
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited10

The paper presents a number of empirical arguments for the perceptual view of speech comprehension. It then argues that a particular version of phenomenal dogmatism can confer immediate justification upon belief. In combination, these two views can bypass Davidsonian skepticism toward knowledge of meanings. The perceptual view alone, however, can bypass a variation on the Davidsonian argument. One reason Davidson thought meanings were not truly graspable was that he believed meanings were private (unlike behavior). But if the perceptual view of speech comprehension is correct, then meanings (or at least conveyed meanings) are public objects like other perceivable entities. Hence, there is no particular problem of language comprehension, even if meanings originate in “private” mental states

Comprehension · Linguistics · Perception · Political science · Publicity · Speech recognition · Computer Science · Language, Metaphor, and Cognition · Philosophy · Psychology

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Open DOIOpen Access