John Dilworth
Biographic Data
| ID | 976596 |
|---|---|
| NAME | John Dilworth |
| GIVEN NAMES | John |
| FAMILY NAME | Dilworth |
| SIGNATURE | DILWORTH J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Western Michigan University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 4 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Semantics naturalized: Propositional indexing plus interactive perception
Perception, Introspection and Functional Consonance
What is the relation between a perceptual experience of an object X as being red, and one's belief, if any, as to the nature of that experience? A traditional Cartesian view would be that, if indeed object X does seem to be red to oneself, then one's resulting introspective belief about it could only be a conforming belief, i.e., a belief that X perceptually seems to be red to oneself‐ rather than, for instance, a belief that X perceptually seems…
The Double Content of Perception
The Perception of Representational Content
Journal Article The Perception of Representational Content Get access John Dilworth John Dilworth John Dilworth, Department of Philosophy, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI 49008, USA Email: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 45, Issue 4, October 2005, Pages 388–411, https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayi050 Published: 01 October 2005
Artistic Expression as Interpretation
According to R. G. Collingwood in The Principles of Art, art is the expression of emotion—a much‐criticized view. I attempt to provide some groundwork for a defensible modern version of such a theory via some novel further criticisms of Collingwood, including the exposure of multiple ambiguities in his main concept of expression of emotion, and a demonstration that, surprisingly enough, his view is unable to account for genuinely creative artisti…
Pictorial Orientation Matters
Journal Article Pictorial Orientation Matters Get access John Dilworth John Dilworth Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 43, Issue 1, January 2003, Pages 39–56, https://doi.org/10.1093/bjaesthetics/43.1.39 Published: 01 January 2003
The Perception of Representational Content
Journal Article The Perception of Representational Content Get access John Dilworth John Dilworth John Dilworth, Department of Philosophy, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI 49008, USA Email: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 45, Issue 4, October 2005, Pages 388–411, https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayi050 Published: 01 October 2005
The Double Content of Perception
Pictorial Orientation Matters
Journal Article Pictorial Orientation Matters Get access John Dilworth John Dilworth Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 43, Issue 1, January 2003, Pages 39–56, https://doi.org/10.1093/bjaesthetics/43.1.39 Published: 01 January 2003
Pictorial Orientation Matters
Journal Article Pictorial Orientation Matters Get access John Dilworth John Dilworth Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 43, Issue 1, January 2003, Pages 39–56, https://doi.org/10.1093/bjaesthetics/43.1.39 Published: 01 January 2003
Artistic Expression as Interpretation
According to R. G. Collingwood in The Principles of Art, art is the expression of emotion—a much‐criticized view. I attempt to provide some groundwork for a defensible modern version of such a theory via some novel further criticisms of Collingwood, including the exposure of multiple ambiguities in his main concept of expression of emotion, and a demonstration that, surprisingly enough, his view is unable to account for genuinely creative artisti…
The Double Content of Perception
The Perception of Representational Content
Journal Article The Perception of Representational Content Get access John Dilworth John Dilworth John Dilworth, Department of Philosophy, Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI 49008, USA Email: [email protected] Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The British Journal of Aesthetics, Volume 45, Issue 4, October 2005, Pages 388–411, https://doi.org/10.1093/aesthj/ayi050 Published: 01 October 2005
Perception, Introspection and Functional Consonance
What is the relation between a perceptual experience of an object X as being red, and one's belief, if any, as to the nature of that experience? A traditional Cartesian view would be that, if indeed object X does seem to be red to oneself, then one's resulting introspective belief about it could only be a conforming belief, i.e., a belief that X perceptually seems to be red to oneself‐ rather than, for instance, a belief that X perceptually seems…
Semantics naturalized: Propositional indexing plus interactive perception
Computer Science (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Artificial Intelligence (4 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Perception (4 works) · Artificial Intelligence (3 works) · Cognitive psychology (3 works) · Linguistics (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works)