Perception, Introspection and Functional Consonance

Bibliographic Data

ID20141818
AuthorsJohn Dilworth (Western Michigan University, corresponding author)
Year2006
Volume72
Issue4
Pages299-318
Publication date2006-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueTheoria (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/j.1755-2567.2006.tb00967.x
OpenAlexW1984548322
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited13

What is the relation between a perceptual experience of an object X as being red, and one's belief, if any, as to the nature of that experience? A traditional Cartesian view would be that, if indeed object X does seem to be red to oneself, then one's resulting introspective belief about it could only be a conforming belief, i.e., a belief that X perceptually seems to be red to oneself‐ rather than, for instance, a belief that X perceptually seems to be green to oneself instead. I offer some non‐Cartesian, functionalist reasons supporting such an introspective certainty view, based on a concept of logical consonance of perceptual dispositions, according to which both experience‐based and belief dispositions cannot diverge in their content, on pain of their having inconsistent manifestations in relevant situations, such as color‐sorting tasks. In addition, other views of introspection are criticized from the perspective of this consonance view

Certainty · Cognitive psychology · Epistemology · Introspection · Object (grammar) · Perception · Relation (database) · Advanced Algebra and Logic · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology

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