Miguel Ángel Sebastián
Biographic Data
| ID | 979367 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Miguel Ángel Sebastián |
| GIVEN NAMES | Miguel Ángel |
| FAMILY NAME | Sebastián |
| SIGNATURE | SEBASTIÁN M Á |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1890-8319 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 9 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Narrative immersion as an attentional phenomenon
Some stories generate in us a peculiar experience of intense narrative engagement. This common experience, which we call narrative immersion, has been the object of a vast literature in psychology and other disciplines. Philosophers, however, have only recently engaged with this topic and the tendency has been to explain it by postulating specific kinds of mental states. We propose a different approach, explaining narrative immersion by means of …
First-Person Perspective in Experience
Consciousness and Perspectival De Se content
Most people think indexical thought has special content ( de se content). However, it has been acknowledged that classical examples, such as those offered by Perry and Lewis, are insufficient to establish this conclusion. Ongoing discussions typically focus on first-person beliefs and their relationship to the explanation of successful behavior and linguistic practices. Instead, I want to direct attention to the phenomenal content of our consciou…
First-person representations and responsible agency in AI
A consciousness-based quantum objective collapse model
Subjective Character, the Ego and De Se Representation
There is a substantive disagreement with regard to the characterization of pre-reflective self-awareness despite the key role that is supposed to play for the distinction between conscious and unconscious states. One of the most prominent ones—between egological and non-egological views—is about the role that the subject of experience plays.I show that this disagreement falls short to capture the details of the debate, as it does not distinguish …
Hay muchas cosas que creo de mí mismo (consciente e inconscientemente) sin saber que las creo
En un artículo publicado recientemente (2014) en esta revista, Javier Vidal argumenta que toda creencia de primera persona es una creencia consciente, una conclusión que pone en jaque ciertas teorías de la consciencia, como él mismo expone. El razonamiento de Vidal se basa en un argumento que muestra que uno conoce toda creencia de primera persona que tiene y en un principio (SC*) que vincula conocimiento y consciencia. Mi objetivo en este trabaj…
Borderline Experiences One Cannot Undergo
Representationalism maintains that the phenomenal character of an experience is fully determined by its intentional content. Representationalism is a very attractive theory in the project of naturalizing consciousness, on the assumption that the relation of representation can itself be naturalized. For this purpose, representationalists with naturalistic inclinations typically appeal to teleological theories of mental content. Not much attention …
Dreams
Dreams
Borderline Experiences One Cannot Undergo
Representationalism maintains that the phenomenal character of an experience is fully determined by its intentional content. Representationalism is a very attractive theory in the project of naturalizing consciousness, on the assumption that the relation of representation can itself be naturalized. For this purpose, representationalists with naturalistic inclinations typically appeal to teleological theories of mental content. Not much attention …
Hay muchas cosas que creo de mí mismo (consciente e inconscientemente) sin saber que las creo
En un artículo publicado recientemente (2014) en esta revista, Javier Vidal argumenta que toda creencia de primera persona es una creencia consciente, una conclusión que pone en jaque ciertas teorías de la consciencia, como él mismo expone. El razonamiento de Vidal se basa en un argumento que muestra que uno conoce toda creencia de primera persona que tiene y en un principio (SC*) que vincula conocimiento y consciencia. Mi objetivo en este trabaj…
Subjective Character, the Ego and De Se Representation
There is a substantive disagreement with regard to the characterization of pre-reflective self-awareness despite the key role that is supposed to play for the distinction between conscious and unconscious states. One of the most prominent ones—between egological and non-egological views—is about the role that the subject of experience plays.I show that this disagreement falls short to capture the details of the debate, as it does not distinguish …
A consciousness-based quantum objective collapse model
First-person representations and responsible agency in AI
First-Person Perspective in Experience
Consciousness and Perspectival De Se content
Most people think indexical thought has special content ( de se content). However, it has been acknowledged that classical examples, such as those offered by Perry and Lewis, are insufficient to establish this conclusion. Ongoing discussions typically focus on first-person beliefs and their relationship to the explanation of successful behavior and linguistic practices. Instead, I want to direct attention to the phenomenal content of our consciou…
Narrative immersion as an attentional phenomenon
Some stories generate in us a peculiar experience of intense narrative engagement. This common experience, which we call narrative immersion, has been the object of a vast literature in psychology and other disciplines. Philosophers, however, have only recently engaged with this topic and the tendency has been to explain it by postulating specific kinds of mental states. We propose a different approach, explaining narrative immersion by means of …
Epistemology (9 works) · Philosophy (9 works) · Psychology (7 works) · Consciousness (6 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Philosophy of language (4 works) · Cognitive psychology (3 works) · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (3 works)