Subjective Character, the Ego and De Se Representation

There is a substantive disagreement with regard to the characterization of pre-reflective self-awareness despite the key role that is supposed to play for the distinction between conscious and unconscious states. One of the most prominent ones—between egological and non-egological views—is about the role that the subject of experience plays.I show that this disagreement falls short to capture the details of the debate, as it does not distinguish phenomenological and metaphysical disputes. Regarding the former, the contenders disagree on whether pre-reflective self-awareness concerns the subject of experience or the experience itself. I first argue that such an awareness has to be indexical—de se or de mentis respectively—, and then show that de se awareness can straightforwardly address classical objec­tions against egological views, whereas de mentis awareness fails to support epistemological arguments in favor of non-egological ones. The metaphysical commitments of a phenomenologically egological view depend on what the corresponding de se awareness demands from reality. I consider two alternatives, the structural and the representational approach and offer some consid­erations in favor of the later and its prima facie neutrality with regard to the metaphysical dispute

Epistemology · Indexicality · Metaphysics · Neutrality · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Political science · Politics · Prima facie · Unconscious mind · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

• The polysemy of “I”

  Open Access•Susanna Schellenberg•Mind & Language•2026

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