Robert D Rupert
Biographic Data
| ID | 980220 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Robert D Rupert |
| GIVEN NAMES | Robert D |
| FAMILY NAME | Rupert |
| SIGNATURE | RUPERT R D |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Colorado Boulder |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7501-3832 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 12 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1983 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Mixed‐resource modeling meets the philosophy of mind
This essay argues for a mixed‐resource approach to scientific modeling and applies it to questions in philosophy of mind. A mixed‐resource approach makes use of whatever resources—at whatever scale, from whatever academic discipline—seem useful, freely combining such varied resources in individual models. The success of mixed‐resource modeling challenges the widely shared commitment to a personal level in the context of which mental states are to…
Cognitive Systems, Predictive Processing, and the Self
Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale
A vexing problem in contemporary epistemology—one with origins in Plato’s Meno —concerns the value of knowledge, and in particular, whether and how the value of knowledge exceeds the value of mere (unknown) true opinion. The recent literature is deeply divided on the matter of how best to address the problem. One point, however, remains unquestioned: that if a solution is to be found, it will be at the personal level, the level at which states of…
Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension
Book Review| April 01 2012 Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension Clark, Andy, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. xxix+286 pp. Robert D. Rupert Robert D. Rupert Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 304–308. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-1539161 Views Icon Views Article contents Figur…
Empirical Arguments for Group Minds: A Critical Appraisal
This entry addresses the question of group minds, by focusing specifically on empirical arguments for group cognition and group cognitive states. Two kinds of positive argument are presented and critically evaluated: the argument from individually unintended effects and the argument from functional similarity. A general argument against group cognition - which appeals to Occam's razor - is also discussed. In the end, much turns on the identificat…
Cognitive systems and the extended mind
The Causal Theory of Properties and the Causal Theory of Reference, or How to Name Properties and Why It Matters
The Causal Theory of Properties (CTP) (Shoemaker 1980a, 1980b, 1998) presents a striking picture: although a property might ultimately be distinct from the causal powers it confers on its instantiations (Shoemaker 1998, p. 64), those causal powers limn the property’s identity. In the words of CTP’s leading proponent, Sydney Shoemaker, “The formulation of the causal theory of properties I now favor ... says that the causal features of a property, …
Causal Theories of Mental Content
Causal theories of mental content (CTs) ground certain aspects of a concept's meaning in the causal relations a concept bears to what it represents. explains the problems CTs are meant to solve and introduces terminology commonly used to discuss these problems. specifies criteria that any acceptable CT must satisfy. critically survey various CTs, including those proposed by Fred Dretske, Jerry Fodor, Ruth Garrett Millikan, David Papineau, Dennis …
Realization, completers, and ceteris paribus laws in psychology
I defend Jerry Fodor's ([1991]) account of the semantics of ceteris paribus laws against an objection raised by Peter Mott ([1992]). In doing so, I clarify certain issues regarding the nature of realization. I argue that not all things that realize a state or property are realizers of that state or property: the relation x realizes y tolerates the inclusion of gratuitous elements in x— elements that play no particular role in the realization of y…
Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition
On the Relationship Between Naturalistic Semantics and Individuation Criteria for Terms in a Language of Thought
Native Broadcasting in Canada
Robert Rupert, Native Broadcasting in Canada, Anthropologica, New Series, Vol. 25, No. 1, Journalistes amérindiens: études sur le travail d'une minorité professionnelle / Native North Americans and the Media: Studies in Minority Journalism (1983), pp. 53-61
Empirical Arguments for Group Minds: A Critical Appraisal
This entry addresses the question of group minds, by focusing specifically on empirical arguments for group cognition and group cognitive states. Two kinds of positive argument are presented and critically evaluated: the argument from individually unintended effects and the argument from functional similarity. A general argument against group cognition - which appeals to Occam's razor - is also discussed. In the end, much turns on the identificat…
Causal Theories of Mental Content
Causal theories of mental content (CTs) ground certain aspects of a concept's meaning in the causal relations a concept bears to what it represents. explains the problems CTs are meant to solve and introduces terminology commonly used to discuss these problems. specifies criteria that any acceptable CT must satisfy. critically survey various CTs, including those proposed by Fred Dretske, Jerry Fodor, Ruth Garrett Millikan, David Papineau, Dennis …
On the Relationship Between Naturalistic Semantics and Individuation Criteria for Terms in a Language of Thought
Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale
A vexing problem in contemporary epistemology—one with origins in Plato’s Meno —concerns the value of knowledge, and in particular, whether and how the value of knowledge exceeds the value of mere (unknown) true opinion. The recent literature is deeply divided on the matter of how best to address the problem. One point, however, remains unquestioned: that if a solution is to be found, it will be at the personal level, the level at which states of…
Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension
Book Review| April 01 2012 Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension Clark, Andy, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. xxix+286 pp. Robert D. Rupert Robert D. Rupert Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 304–308. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-1539161 Views Icon Views Article contents Figur…
Native Broadcasting in Canada
Robert Rupert, Native Broadcasting in Canada, Anthropologica, New Series, Vol. 25, No. 1, Journalistes amérindiens: études sur le travail d'une minorité professionnelle / Native North Americans and the Media: Studies in Minority Journalism (1983), pp. 53-61
On the Relationship Between Naturalistic Semantics and Individuation Criteria for Terms in a Language of Thought
Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition
Realization, completers, and ceteris paribus laws in psychology
I defend Jerry Fodor's ([1991]) account of the semantics of ceteris paribus laws against an objection raised by Peter Mott ([1992]). In doing so, I clarify certain issues regarding the nature of realization. I argue that not all things that realize a state or property are realizers of that state or property: the relation x realizes y tolerates the inclusion of gratuitous elements in x— elements that play no particular role in the realization of y…
The Causal Theory of Properties and the Causal Theory of Reference, or How to Name Properties and Why It Matters
The Causal Theory of Properties (CTP) (Shoemaker 1980a, 1980b, 1998) presents a striking picture: although a property might ultimately be distinct from the causal powers it confers on its instantiations (Shoemaker 1998, p. 64), those causal powers limn the property’s identity. In the words of CTP’s leading proponent, Sydney Shoemaker, “The formulation of the causal theory of properties I now favor ... says that the causal features of a property, …
Causal Theories of Mental Content
Causal theories of mental content (CTs) ground certain aspects of a concept's meaning in the causal relations a concept bears to what it represents. explains the problems CTs are meant to solve and introduces terminology commonly used to discuss these problems. specifies criteria that any acceptable CT must satisfy. critically survey various CTs, including those proposed by Fred Dretske, Jerry Fodor, Ruth Garrett Millikan, David Papineau, Dennis …
Cognitive systems and the extended mind
Empirical Arguments for Group Minds: A Critical Appraisal
This entry addresses the question of group minds, by focusing specifically on empirical arguments for group cognition and group cognitive states. Two kinds of positive argument are presented and critically evaluated: the argument from individually unintended effects and the argument from functional similarity. A general argument against group cognition - which appeals to Occam's razor - is also discussed. In the end, much turns on the identificat…
Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension
Book Review| April 01 2012 Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension Clark, Andy, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. xxix+286 pp. Robert D. Rupert Robert D. Rupert Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2012) 121 (2): 304–308. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-1539161 Views Icon Views Article contents Figur…
Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale
A vexing problem in contemporary epistemology—one with origins in Plato’s Meno —concerns the value of knowledge, and in particular, whether and how the value of knowledge exceeds the value of mere (unknown) true opinion. The recent literature is deeply divided on the matter of how best to address the problem. One point, however, remains unquestioned: that if a solution is to be found, it will be at the personal level, the level at which states of…
Cognitive Systems, Predictive Processing, and the Self
Mixed‐resource modeling meets the philosophy of mind
This essay argues for a mixed‐resource approach to scientific modeling and applies it to questions in philosophy of mind. A mixed‐resource approach makes use of whatever resources—at whatever scale, from whatever academic discipline—seem useful, freely combining such varied resources in individual models. The success of mixed‐resource modeling challenges the widely shared commitment to a personal level in the context of which mental states are to…
Computer Science (9 works) · Epistemology (9 works) · Psychology (9 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 works) · Embodied and Extended Cognition (6 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (6 works) · Cognition (5 works) · Cognitive science (5 works) · Cognitive psychology (4 works)