Realization, completers, and ceteris paribus laws in psychology
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8397188 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Robert D Rupert (0000-0001-7501-3832, University of Edinburgh, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 1-11 |
| Publication date | 2007-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0007-0882 • E-ISSN: 1464-3537 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/bjps/axl029 |
| OpenAlex | W2001491253 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 6 |
I defend Jerry Fodor's ([1991]) account of the semantics of ceteris paribus laws against an objection raised by Peter Mott ([1992]). In doing so, I clarify certain issues regarding the nature of realization. I argue that not all things that realize a state or property are realizers of that state or property: the relation x realizes y tolerates the inclusion of gratuitous elements in x— elements that play no particular role in the realization of y— whereas the relation xis a realizer ofy does not. I then criticize a rejoinder that, in effect, builds such gratuitous elements into the antecedents of the laws of a science of the realized properties. 1. Fodor's Proposal2. Mott's Objection3. Conjunctive States, Realization, and Minimal Realization4. Mixed Antecedents
Ceteris paribus · Epistemology · Inclusion (mineral) · Law and economics · Nomothetic and idiographic · Property (philosophy) · Realization (probability) · Relation (database) · Sociology · State (computer science) · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |