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Jordan Howard Sobel

Biographic Data

ID986462
NAMEJordan Howard Sobel
GIVEN NAMESJordan Howard
FAMILY NAMESobel
SIGNATURESOBEL J H
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Toronto
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS33
TOTAL CITATIONS62
AUTHOR COUNT33
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1965
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2008
H-INDEX5
  • ‘Hoist with His Owne Petar’: 1 On the Undoing of a Liar Paradox

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Theoria•2008

    A Liar would express a proposition that is true and not true. A Liar Paradox would, per impossibile , demonstrate the reality of a Liar . To resolve a Liar Paradox it is sufficient to make out of its demonstration a reductio of the existence of the proposition that would be true and not true, and to “explain away” the charm of the paradoxical contrary demonstration. Persuasive demonstrations of the Liar Paradox in this paper trade on allusive sco…

  • Money Pumps

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2001•Cited by: 1•References: 8

    After maintaining in (Sobel 1997) that certain cyclical preferences can be reasonable, the following questions were tabled: “in what circumstances and under what assumptions ... these ... preferences of George's would turn him into a ”money pump,” and in what circumstances and under what assumptions they would not do that.” (47) Two pumps afford answers. George, who is sufficiently reasonable and well-informed to use backward induction, has, for …

  • Blackburn's Problem: On Its Not Insignificant Residue

    Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2001•References: 2

    Moral properties would supervene upon non‐moral properties and be conceptually autonomous. That, according to Simon Blackburn, would make them if not impossible at least mysterious, and evidence for them best explained by theorists who say they are not real. In fact moral properties would not challenge in ways Blackburn has contended. There is, however, something new that can be gathered from his arguments. What would the supervenience of moral p…

  • Cyclical Preferences and World Bayesianism

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1997•Cited by: 1•References: 17

    An example shows that ‘pairwise preferences’ (certain hypothetical choices) can cycle even when rational. General considerations entail that preferences tout court (certain relations of actual valuations) cannot cycle. A world-bayesian theory is explained that accommodates these two kinds of preference, and a theory for rational actions that would have them maximize and be objects of ratifiable choices. It is observed that choices can be unratifi…

  • Hume's Utilitarian Theory of Right Action

    Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1997•Cited by: 1•References: 2

    A theory of right action is implicit in Hume’s delineation of the virtues. It gives qualified priority to ‘rules of justice’ as Hume’s remarks on ‘that species of utility which attends this virtue’ require. It is a useful actual‐rule, not an ideal possible‐rule, purely utilitarian theory that discounts rules of justice in ‘extraordinary cases’, has a problem when rules conflict, and invites the question ‘Why not hark directly to the supreme law o…

  • Pascalian wagers

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1996•Cited by: 4•References: 15

  • On the significance of conditional probabilities

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1996•Cited by: 1•References: 11

  • Taking Chances

    Brian Skyrms, Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1996

  • Must Constrained Maximizers Be Uncharitable

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1996•References: 8

    By his definition of them, David Gauthier's co-operative constrained maximizers are not necessarily unsharing and disposed to exclude straight maximizers from benefits of their co-operation. Here is Gauthier's full and exact account, his official account, of constrained maximization

  • Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice

    Marina Bianchi, Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1995•Cited by: 11

    Journal Article Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice. Get access Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice. By SOBEL (JORDAN HOWARD). (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. x + 376. £35.00 hardback, US $59.95 hardback. ISBN 0 521 41635 3.) Marina Bianchi Marina Bianchi Università di Cassino, Italy Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 105, Issue 432, 1 Se…

  • Rights to Punish for Libertarians

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1995•References: 8

    Thomas Hurka derives rights to punish from what I will term the Libertarian Rights Principle, which is “that there is really only one natural right, namely the equal right of all persons to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for other persons, and that all other natural rights are species or instances of the right to liberty.” These rights to punish, he says, (1) extend only to punishing violators of rights, never to “punis…

  • Plato's Crito: A question of agreement

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Theoria•1994

  • Backward-Induction Arguments: A Paradox Regained

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1993•Cited by: 2•References: 10

    According to a familiar argument, iterated prisoner's dilemmas of known finite lengths resolve for ideally rational and well-informed players: They would defect in the last round, anticipate this in the next to last round and so defect in it, and so on. But would they anticipate defections even if they had been cooperating? Not necessarily, say recent critics. These critics “lose” the backward-induction paradox by imposing indicative interpretati…

  • Some versions of Newcomb's Problem are Prisoners' Dilemmas

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1991•Cited by: 1•References: 12

  • Non-dominance, third person and non-action Newcomb problems, and metatickles

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1991•References: 16

  • Hume's Theorem on Testimony Sufficient to Establish a Miracle

    Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1991•Cited by: 1

    Journal Article Hume's Theorem on Testimony Sufficient to Establish a Miracle Get access Jordan Howard Sobel Jordan Howard Sobel University of Toronto Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 41, Issue 163, April 1991, Pages 229–237, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219595 Published: 01 April 1991

  • Maximization, Stability of Decision, and Actions in Accordance with Reason

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1990•Cited by: 4•References: 14

    Rational actions reflect beliefs and preferences in certain orderly ways. The problem of theory is to explain which beliefs and preferences are relevant to the rationality of particular actions, and exactly how they are relevant. One distinction of interest here is between an agent's beliefs and preferences just before an action's time, and his beliefs and preferences at its time. Theorists do not agree about the times of beliefs and desires that…

  • Partition-Theorems for Causal Decision Theories

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1989•Cited by: 6•References: 11

    Two partition-theorems are proved for a particular causal decision theory. One is restricted to a certain kind of partition of circumstances, and analyzes the utility of an option in terms of its utilities in conjunction with circumstances in this partition. The other analyzes an option's utility in terms of its utilities conditional on circumstances and is quite unrestricted. While the first form seems more useful for applications, the second fo…

  • Defenses and conservative revisions of evidential decision theories: Metatickles and ratificationism

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1988•Cited by: 4•References: 15

  • Infallible Predictors

    Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1988•Cited by: 5

  • Maximizing, Optimizing, and Prospering

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1988•Cited by: 1•References: 15

    David Gauthier distinguishes maximizing given the actions others do from maximizing given the happiness others get, and maintains that universal conformities to the first rule coincide with equilibria in utility spaces of possible interactions, whereas universal conformities to the second coincide with optima. In Part One of the present paper some of his views concerning these matters of technical detail are tested under a variety of interpretati…

  • The law student and his teacher

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Theoria•1987

  • On the Evidence of Testimony for Miracles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis

    Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1987•Cited by: 5

    Journal Article On The Evidence of Testimony For Miracles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume'S Analysis Get access Jordan Howard Sobel Jordan Howard Sobel University of Toronto Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 37, Issue 147, April 1987, Pages 166–186, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220336 Published: 01 April 1987

  • Circumstances and dominance in a causal decision theory

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1985•Cited by: 7•References: 9

  • Utilitarianism and Cooperation

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1985•Cited by: 3

    Donald Regan's book is a study of forms of utilitarian theory and of properties to which these forms may aspire. He deals exclusively with "fully objective" theories that seek to systematize and set conditions for obligations that an agent is supposed to lie under as a consequence of features of situations in which he finds himself, with no dependence on his possibly defective beliefs, attitudes, and values (except as features of his situations).…

Next
  • Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice

    Marina Bianchi, Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1995•Cited by: 11

    Journal Article Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice. Get access Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice. By SOBEL (JORDAN HOWARD). (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. x + 376. £35.00 hardback, US $59.95 hardback. ISBN 0 521 41635 3.) Marina Bianchi Marina Bianchi Università di Cassino, Italy Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 105, Issue 432, 1 Se…

  • Circumstances and dominance in a causal decision theory

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1985•Cited by: 7•References: 9

  • Partition-Theorems for Causal Decision Theories

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1989•Cited by: 6•References: 11

    Two partition-theorems are proved for a particular causal decision theory. One is restricted to a certain kind of partition of circumstances, and analyzes the utility of an option in terms of its utilities in conjunction with circumstances in this partition. The other analyzes an option's utility in terms of its utilities conditional on circumstances and is quite unrestricted. While the first form seems more useful for applications, the second fo…

  • Infallible Predictors

    Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1988•Cited by: 5

  • On the Evidence of Testimony for Miracles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis

    Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1987•Cited by: 5

    Journal Article On The Evidence of Testimony For Miracles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume'S Analysis Get access Jordan Howard Sobel Jordan Howard Sobel University of Toronto Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 37, Issue 147, April 1987, Pages 166–186, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220336 Published: 01 April 1987

  • Pascalian wagers

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1996•Cited by: 4•References: 15

  • Maximization, Stability of Decision, and Actions in Accordance with Reason

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1990•Cited by: 4•References: 14

    Rational actions reflect beliefs and preferences in certain orderly ways. The problem of theory is to explain which beliefs and preferences are relevant to the rationality of particular actions, and exactly how they are relevant. One distinction of interest here is between an agent's beliefs and preferences just before an action's time, and his beliefs and preferences at its time. Theorists do not agree about the times of beliefs and desires that…

  • Defenses and conservative revisions of evidential decision theories: Metatickles and ratificationism

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1988•Cited by: 4•References: 15

  • Utilitarianism and Cooperation

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1985•Cited by: 3

    Donald Regan's book is a study of forms of utilitarian theory and of properties to which these forms may aspire. He deals exclusively with "fully objective" theories that seek to systematize and set conditions for obligations that an agent is supposed to lie under as a consequence of features of situations in which he finds himself, with no dependence on his possibly defective beliefs, attitudes, and values (except as features of his situations).…

  • Backward-Induction Arguments: A Paradox Regained

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1993•Cited by: 2•References: 10

    According to a familiar argument, iterated prisoner's dilemmas of known finite lengths resolve for ideally rational and well-informed players: They would defect in the last round, anticipate this in the next to last round and so defect in it, and so on. But would they anticipate defections even if they had been cooperating? Not necessarily, say recent critics. These critics “lose” the backward-induction paradox by imposing indicative interpretati…

  • Determinism: A Small Point

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1975•Cited by: 2•References: 1

    The usual argument to show that Causal Determinism entails that our actions are determined by factors at no time under our control is defective. Though repairs suggest themselves, none are both plausible and obviously adequate. I substantiate these claims in turn

  • Money Pumps

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•2001•Cited by: 1•References: 8

    After maintaining in (Sobel 1997) that certain cyclical preferences can be reasonable, the following questions were tabled: “in what circumstances and under what assumptions ... these ... preferences of George's would turn him into a ”money pump,” and in what circumstances and under what assumptions they would not do that.” (47) Two pumps afford answers. George, who is sufficiently reasonable and well-informed to use backward induction, has, for …

  • Cyclical Preferences and World Bayesianism

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1997•Cited by: 1•References: 17

    An example shows that ‘pairwise preferences’ (certain hypothetical choices) can cycle even when rational. General considerations entail that preferences tout court (certain relations of actual valuations) cannot cycle. A world-bayesian theory is explained that accommodates these two kinds of preference, and a theory for rational actions that would have them maximize and be objects of ratifiable choices. It is observed that choices can be unratifi…

  • Hume's Utilitarian Theory of Right Action

    Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1997•Cited by: 1•References: 2

    A theory of right action is implicit in Hume’s delineation of the virtues. It gives qualified priority to ‘rules of justice’ as Hume’s remarks on ‘that species of utility which attends this virtue’ require. It is a useful actual‐rule, not an ideal possible‐rule, purely utilitarian theory that discounts rules of justice in ‘extraordinary cases’, has a problem when rules conflict, and invites the question ‘Why not hark directly to the supreme law o…

  • On the significance of conditional probabilities

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1996•Cited by: 1•References: 11

  • Some versions of Newcomb's Problem are Prisoners' Dilemmas

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1991•Cited by: 1•References: 12

  • Hume's Theorem on Testimony Sufficient to Establish a Miracle

    Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1991•Cited by: 1

    Journal Article Hume's Theorem on Testimony Sufficient to Establish a Miracle Get access Jordan Howard Sobel Jordan Howard Sobel University of Toronto Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 41, Issue 163, April 1991, Pages 229–237, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219595 Published: 01 April 1991

  • Maximizing, Optimizing, and Prospering

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1988•Cited by: 1•References: 15

    David Gauthier distinguishes maximizing given the actions others do from maximizing given the happiness others get, and maintains that universal conformities to the first rule coincide with equilibria in utility spaces of possible interactions, whereas universal conformities to the second coincide with optima. In Part One of the present paper some of his views concerning these matters of technical detail are tested under a variety of interpretati…

  • Utility Maximizers in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1976•Cited by: 1•References: 2

    Maximizers in isolated Prisoner's Dilemmas are doomed to frustration. But in Braybrooke's view maximizers might do better in a series, securing Pareto-optimal arrangements if not from the very beginning, at least eventually. Given certain favourable special conditions, it can be shown according to Braybrooke and shown even without question-begging motivational or value assumptions, that in a series of Dilemmas maximizers could manage to communica…

  • Dummett on Fatalism

    Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1966•Cited by: 1

  • Generalization Arguments

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Theoria•1965

  • Dummett on Fatalism

    Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1966•Cited by: 1

  • An Anatomy of Values: Problems of Personal and Social Choice

    Jordan Howard Sobel, Charles Fried•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1974

  • Determinism: A Small Point

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1975•Cited by: 2•References: 1

    The usual argument to show that Causal Determinism entails that our actions are determined by factors at no time under our control is defective. Though repairs suggest themselves, none are both plausible and obviously adequate. I substantiate these claims in turn

  • Utility Maximizers in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1976•Cited by: 1•References: 2

    Maximizers in isolated Prisoner's Dilemmas are doomed to frustration. But in Braybrooke's view maximizers might do better in a series, securing Pareto-optimal arrangements if not from the very beginning, at least eventually. Given certain favourable special conditions, it can be shown according to Braybrooke and shown even without question-begging motivational or value assumptions, that in a series of Dilemmas maximizers could manage to communica…

  • Utilitarian principles for imperfect agents

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Theoria•1982

  • Expected utilities and rational actions and choices

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Theoria•1983

  • Names and Indefinite Descriptions in Ontological Arguments

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1983•References: 4

    So begins a recent ontological argument. But what if there are no most perfect beings? Letting God be one, that is, letting “God” name one at the very beginning seems premature. Clearly it is best to leave “God” out of the argument until one is in a position to introduce him by existential instantiation, or, by further argumentation, to identify him with a most perfect being: clearly it is best to leave “God” out of the argument until it has been…

  • Circumstances and dominance in a causal decision theory

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1985•Cited by: 7•References: 9

  • Utilitarianism and Cooperation

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1985•Cited by: 3

    Donald Regan's book is a study of forms of utilitarian theory and of properties to which these forms may aspire. He deals exclusively with "fully objective" theories that seek to systematize and set conditions for obligations that an agent is supposed to lie under as a consequence of features of situations in which he finds himself, with no dependence on his possibly defective beliefs, attitudes, and values (except as features of his situations).…

  • The law student and his teacher

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Theoria•1987

  • On the Evidence of Testimony for Miracles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume's Analysis

    Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1987•Cited by: 5

    Journal Article On The Evidence of Testimony For Miracles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume'S Analysis Get access Jordan Howard Sobel Jordan Howard Sobel University of Toronto Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 37, Issue 147, April 1987, Pages 166–186, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220336 Published: 01 April 1987

  • Defenses and conservative revisions of evidential decision theories: Metatickles and ratificationism

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1988•Cited by: 4•References: 15

  • Infallible Predictors

    Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Review•1988•Cited by: 5

  • Maximizing, Optimizing, and Prospering

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1988•Cited by: 1•References: 15

    David Gauthier distinguishes maximizing given the actions others do from maximizing given the happiness others get, and maintains that universal conformities to the first rule coincide with equilibria in utility spaces of possible interactions, whereas universal conformities to the second coincide with optima. In Part One of the present paper some of his views concerning these matters of technical detail are tested under a variety of interpretati…

  • Partition-Theorems for Causal Decision Theories

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1989•Cited by: 6•References: 11

    Two partition-theorems are proved for a particular causal decision theory. One is restricted to a certain kind of partition of circumstances, and analyzes the utility of an option in terms of its utilities in conjunction with circumstances in this partition. The other analyzes an option's utility in terms of its utilities conditional on circumstances and is quite unrestricted. While the first form seems more useful for applications, the second fo…

  • Maximization, Stability of Decision, and Actions in Accordance with Reason

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1990•Cited by: 4•References: 14

    Rational actions reflect beliefs and preferences in certain orderly ways. The problem of theory is to explain which beliefs and preferences are relevant to the rationality of particular actions, and exactly how they are relevant. One distinction of interest here is between an agent's beliefs and preferences just before an action's time, and his beliefs and preferences at its time. Theorists do not agree about the times of beliefs and desires that…

  • Some versions of Newcomb's Problem are Prisoners' Dilemmas

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1991•Cited by: 1•References: 12

  • Non-dominance, third person and non-action Newcomb problems, and metatickles

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1991•References: 16

  • Hume's Theorem on Testimony Sufficient to Establish a Miracle

    Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•The Philosophical Quarterly•1991•Cited by: 1

    Journal Article Hume's Theorem on Testimony Sufficient to Establish a Miracle Get access Jordan Howard Sobel Jordan Howard Sobel University of Toronto Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 41, Issue 163, April 1991, Pages 229–237, https://doi.org/10.2307/2219595 Published: 01 April 1991

  • Backward-Induction Arguments: A Paradox Regained

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Philosophy of Science•1993•Cited by: 2•References: 10

    According to a familiar argument, iterated prisoner's dilemmas of known finite lengths resolve for ideally rational and well-informed players: They would defect in the last round, anticipate this in the next to last round and so defect in it, and so on. But would they anticipate defections even if they had been cooperating? Not necessarily, say recent critics. These critics “lose” the backward-induction paradox by imposing indicative interpretati…

  • Plato's Crito: A question of agreement

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Theoria•1994

  • Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice

    Marina Bianchi, Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•The Economic Journal•1995•Cited by: 11

    Journal Article Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice. Get access Taking Chances: Essays on Rational Choice. By SOBEL (JORDAN HOWARD). (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. x + 376. £35.00 hardback, US $59.95 hardback. ISBN 0 521 41635 3.) Marina Bianchi Marina Bianchi Università di Cassino, Italy Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 105, Issue 432, 1 Se…

  • Rights to Punish for Libertarians

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Dialogue•1995•References: 8

    Thomas Hurka derives rights to punish from what I will term the Libertarian Rights Principle, which is “that there is really only one natural right, namely the equal right of all persons to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for other persons, and that all other natural rights are species or instances of the right to liberty.” These rights to punish, he says, (1) extend only to punishing violators of rights, never to “punis…

  • Pascalian wagers

    Open Access•Jordan Howard Sobel•ARTICLE•Synthese•1996•Cited by: 4•References: 15

Philosophy (26 works) · Epistemology (22 works) · Computer Science (17 works) · Mathematical economics (13 works) · Artificial Intelligence (11 works) · Artificial Intelligence (11 works) · Economics (10 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (9 works) · Mathematics (9 works) · Metaphysics (8 works)

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