Utility Maximizers in Iterated Prisoner's Dilemmas
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 3889014 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jordan Howard Sobel (University of Toronto, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1976 |
| Volume | 15 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 38-53 |
| Publication date | 1976-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300021934 |
| OpenAlex | W2104461888 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 3 |
Maximizers in isolated Prisoner's Dilemmas are doomed to frustration. But in Braybrooke's view maximizers might do better in a series, securing Pareto-optimal arrangements if not from the very beginning, at least eventually. Given certain favourable special conditions, it can be shown according to Braybrooke and shown even without question-begging motivational or value assumptions, that in a series of Dilemmas maximizers could manage to communicate a readiness to reciprocate, generate thereby expectations of reciprocation, and so give rise to optimizing reciprocations which, in due course, would reinforce expectations, the net result of all this being an increasingly stable practice to mutual benefit. In this way neighbours could learn to be good neighbours: they could learn to respect each other's property, to engage in reciprocal assistance, and perhaps even to make and keep promises covering a range of activities. So maximizers are, Braybrooke holds, capable of a society of sorts. Out of the ashes they might build something. But even under favourable conditions they could not build much and most conditions would defeat them almost entirely, for many-person Dilemmas whether isolated or in series would be quite beyond them, question-begging motivational assumptions aside. In settings at all like those in which we live, utility maximization assuming only 'traditional' motivation is self-defeating without remedy, and most certainly not an adequate basis for social life.' The probable inference from as a conception of individual rationality: for surely truly rational agents would be if not perfectly well designed at least better designed for communal living than utility maximizers would be assuming only 'traditional', non-question-begging values or motivation. Or, if this inference is denied and maximization is not challenged as a conception of rationality, we can conclude instead, Braybrooke has more recently suggested (p. 34, this issue), that the advice, 'Be rational,' is incomplete, and when addressed to groups should be supplemented by, 'And be somewhat 'untraditional' in your values; respect at least some rules that would make coordination and cooperation possible even in many-person interaction problems
Aside · Begging · Economics · Epistemology · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Maximization · Microeconomics · Political science · Positive economics · Rationality · Value (mathematics) · Computer Science · Law · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology
| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,06 |
| Citation span | 1978 - 1989 (12) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |