Benjamin Schnieder
Biographic Data
| ID | 987836 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Benjamin Schnieder |
| GIVEN NAMES | Benjamin |
| FAMILY NAME | Schnieder |
| SIGNATURE | SCHNIEDER B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universität Hamburg |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8565-2953 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 18 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 42 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 3 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Kant's Nova Dilucidatio
This paper reassesses Kant's early treatment of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) in the Nova dilucidatio , situating it historically and in contemporary grounding debates. First, I lay out Kant's conceptual framework —his definition of a sufficient reason, and his distinction between antecedently and consequently determining reasons—relating it to Wolff and Crusius and to contemporary grounding theory. I argue that the framework yields va…
Aristotle’s insight on truth: ‘That p is true because p ’
Aristotle famously observed: That you are pale is true because you are pale—but not vice versa. This insight plays an important role in contemporary debates about truth by expressing truth’s dependency on being. However, how to account for this insight remains controversial. This paper employs the logic of grounding to derive Aristotle’s insight rigorously. The derivation requires a specific truth theory as its starting point. Here, Wolfgang Künn…
On ground and consequence
Atomism and Fundamentality
The paper focusses on two claims about metaphysical structure: Atomism and Fundamentalism. The first of these claims says that there are mereological atoms, i.e. minimal elements in the mereological structure of reality. The second says that there are fundamental truths, i.e. minimal elements in the grounding structure of reality. A philosopher who defended both of these claims was Bernard Bolzano; the present paper is an exploration of his views…
Grounding and dependence
Varieties of Dependence: Ontological Dependence, Grounding, Supervenience, ResponseDependence
Explanation by induction
Varieties of dependence: Ontological Dependence, Grounding, Supervenience, Response-Dependence
Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality
Some of the most eminent and enduring philosophical questions concern matters of priority: what is prior to what? What 'grounds' what? Is, for instance, matter prior to mind? Recently, a vivid debate has arisen about how such questions have to be understood. Can the relevant notion or notions of priority be spelled out? And how do they relate to other metaphysical notions, such as modality, truth-making or essence? This volume of new essays, by l…
Grounding and explanation
Some of the most eminent and enduring philosophical questions concern matters of priority: what is prior to what? What 'grounds' what? Is, for instance, matter prior to mind? Recently, a vivid debate has arisen about how such questions have to be understood. Can the relevant notion or notions of priority be spelled out? And how do they relate to other metaphysical notions, such as modality, truth-making or essence? This volume of new essays, by l…
Themes From Early Analytic Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Künne
Foreword Wolfgang Kunne: Bibliography Truth and Assertion Ian Rumfitt: Truth and the Determination of Content: Variations on Themes from Frege's Logische Untersuchungen Manuel Garcia-Carpintero: Truth-Bearers and Modesty Edgar Morscher: Logical Truth and Logical Form Mark Siebel: It Falls Somewhat Short of Logical Precision. Bolzano on Kant's Definition of Analyticity Concepts and Propositions Hans-Johann Glock: A Cognitivist Approach to Concepts…
A Logic for ‘Because’
In spite of its significance for everyday and philosophical discourse, the explanatory connective ‘because’ has not received much treatment in the philosophy of logic. The present paper develops a logic for ‘because’ based on systematic connections between ‘because’ and the truth-functional connectives.
Expressivism Concerning Epistemic Modals: Expressivism Concerning Epistemic Modals
Journal Article Expressivism Concerning Epistemic Modals Get access Benjamin Schnieder Benjamin Schnieder Humboldt‐Universität zu Berlin Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 60, Issue 240, July 2010, Pages 601–615, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.643.x Published: 03 August 2009
In Defence of Fictional Realism
Fictional realism, i.e., the view that because fictions exist, fictional characters exist as well, has recently been accused of leading to inconsistency generated by phenomena of indeterminacy and inconsistency in fiction. We examine in detail four arguments against fictional realism, and present a version of fictional realism which can withstand those arguments
On what we can ensure
The Importance of 'Being Earnest
Reference to properties is normally achieved by the use of nominalizations of predicative expressions. I examine the relation between different kinds of these: while, traditionally, the terms ‘wisdom’ and ‘the property of being wise’ were thought to be co‐referential, in certain contexts they do not seem to be interchangeable salva veritate. Observing this, Friederike Moltmann claims that abstract nouns such as ‘wisdom’ do not refer to properties…
Truth-Making without Truth-Makers
By Leibniz's Law: Remarks on a Fallacy
I investigate a form of argument which refers to Leibniz's law as its inference ticket (where ‘Leibniz's law’ is understood as the thesis that if x = y, then all properties of x are properties of y, and vice versa). Arguments of this form are often used to establish certain categorial distinctions, e.g., a distinction between kinds and properties, or a distinction between processes and events. I show that there can be deficient arguments of this …
Truth-Making without Truth-Makers
Grounding and dependence
By Leibniz's Law: Remarks on a Fallacy
I investigate a form of argument which refers to Leibniz's law as its inference ticket (where ‘Leibniz's law’ is understood as the thesis that if x = y, then all properties of x are properties of y, and vice versa). Arguments of this form are often used to establish certain categorial distinctions, e.g., a distinction between kinds and properties, or a distinction between processes and events. I show that there can be deficient arguments of this …
Expressivism Concerning Epistemic Modals: Expressivism Concerning Epistemic Modals
Journal Article Expressivism Concerning Epistemic Modals Get access Benjamin Schnieder Benjamin Schnieder Humboldt‐Universität zu Berlin Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 60, Issue 240, July 2010, Pages 601–615, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.643.x Published: 03 August 2009
In Defence of Fictional Realism
Fictional realism, i.e., the view that because fictions exist, fictional characters exist as well, has recently been accused of leading to inconsistency generated by phenomena of indeterminacy and inconsistency in fiction. We examine in detail four arguments against fictional realism, and present a version of fictional realism which can withstand those arguments
Explanation by induction
On what we can ensure
Truth-Making without Truth-Makers
By Leibniz's Law: Remarks on a Fallacy
I investigate a form of argument which refers to Leibniz's law as its inference ticket (where ‘Leibniz's law’ is understood as the thesis that if x = y, then all properties of x are properties of y, and vice versa). Arguments of this form are often used to establish certain categorial distinctions, e.g., a distinction between kinds and properties, or a distinction between processes and events. I show that there can be deficient arguments of this …
The Importance of 'Being Earnest
Reference to properties is normally achieved by the use of nominalizations of predicative expressions. I examine the relation between different kinds of these: while, traditionally, the terms ‘wisdom’ and ‘the property of being wise’ were thought to be co‐referential, in certain contexts they do not seem to be interchangeable salva veritate. Observing this, Friederike Moltmann claims that abstract nouns such as ‘wisdom’ do not refer to properties…
On what we can ensure
Expressivism Concerning Epistemic Modals: Expressivism Concerning Epistemic Modals
Journal Article Expressivism Concerning Epistemic Modals Get access Benjamin Schnieder Benjamin Schnieder Humboldt‐Universität zu Berlin Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 60, Issue 240, July 2010, Pages 601–615, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.643.x Published: 03 August 2009
In Defence of Fictional Realism
Fictional realism, i.e., the view that because fictions exist, fictional characters exist as well, has recently been accused of leading to inconsistency generated by phenomena of indeterminacy and inconsistency in fiction. We examine in detail four arguments against fictional realism, and present a version of fictional realism which can withstand those arguments
Themes From Early Analytic Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Künne
Foreword Wolfgang Kunne: Bibliography Truth and Assertion Ian Rumfitt: Truth and the Determination of Content: Variations on Themes from Frege's Logische Untersuchungen Manuel Garcia-Carpintero: Truth-Bearers and Modesty Edgar Morscher: Logical Truth and Logical Form Mark Siebel: It Falls Somewhat Short of Logical Precision. Bolzano on Kant's Definition of Analyticity Concepts and Propositions Hans-Johann Glock: A Cognitivist Approach to Concepts…
A Logic for ‘Because’
In spite of its significance for everyday and philosophical discourse, the explanatory connective ‘because’ has not received much treatment in the philosophy of logic. The present paper develops a logic for ‘because’ based on systematic connections between ‘because’ and the truth-functional connectives.
Metaphysical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality
Some of the most eminent and enduring philosophical questions concern matters of priority: what is prior to what? What 'grounds' what? Is, for instance, matter prior to mind? Recently, a vivid debate has arisen about how such questions have to be understood. Can the relevant notion or notions of priority be spelled out? And how do they relate to other metaphysical notions, such as modality, truth-making or essence? This volume of new essays, by l…
Grounding and explanation
Some of the most eminent and enduring philosophical questions concern matters of priority: what is prior to what? What 'grounds' what? Is, for instance, matter prior to mind? Recently, a vivid debate has arisen about how such questions have to be understood. Can the relevant notion or notions of priority be spelled out? And how do they relate to other metaphysical notions, such as modality, truth-making or essence? This volume of new essays, by l…
Varieties of Dependence: Ontological Dependence, Grounding, Supervenience, ResponseDependence
Explanation by induction
Varieties of dependence: Ontological Dependence, Grounding, Supervenience, Response-Dependence
Atomism and Fundamentality
The paper focusses on two claims about metaphysical structure: Atomism and Fundamentalism. The first of these claims says that there are mereological atoms, i.e. minimal elements in the mereological structure of reality. The second says that there are fundamental truths, i.e. minimal elements in the grounding structure of reality. A philosopher who defended both of these claims was Bernard Bolzano; the present paper is an exploration of his views…
Grounding and dependence
On ground and consequence
Aristotle’s insight on truth: ‘That p is true because p ’
Aristotle famously observed: That you are pale is true because you are pale—but not vice versa. This insight plays an important role in contemporary debates about truth by expressing truth’s dependency on being. However, how to account for this insight remains controversial. This paper employs the logic of grounding to derive Aristotle’s insight rigorously. The derivation requires a specific truth theory as its starting point. Here, Wolfgang Künn…
The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Kant's Nova Dilucidatio
This paper reassesses Kant's early treatment of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) in the Nova dilucidatio , situating it historically and in contemporary grounding debates. First, I lay out Kant's conceptual framework —his definition of a sufficient reason, and his distinction between antecedently and consequently determining reasons—relating it to Wolff and Crusius and to contemporary grounding theory. I argue that the framework yields va…
Epistemology (15 works) · Philosophy (14 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (12 works) · Metaphysics (9 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (5 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (5 works) · Philosophy of language (5 works) · Philosophy of science (5 works)