Michael Blome-Tillmann
Biographic Data
| ID | 989168 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael Blome-Tillmann |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael |
| FAMILY NAME | Blome-Tillmann |
| SIGNATURE | BLOME-TILLMANN M |
| AFFILIATIONS | McGill University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5572-643X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 22 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Gerken on epistemic focal bias
According to Gerken's psychological explanation of the Bank Case data, our intuitions in the High Standards version of the Bank Case are mistaken and the result of a wider pattern of cognitive error or bias - namely, of epistemic focal bias. In this article, I challenge Gerken's view by pointing out two types of difficulties. First, that the view seems to be subject to counterexamples, and second, that the explanation favoured by Gerken overgener…
Impurism, pragmatic encroachment, and the Argument from Principles
Sensitivity Actually
A number of prominent epistemologists claim that the principle of sensitivity “play[s] a starring role in the solution to some important epistemological problems” (DeRose 2010: 161; also Nozick 1981). I argue that traditional sensitivity accounts fail to explain even the most basic data that are usually considered to constitute their primary motivation. To establish this result I develop Gettier and lottery cases involving necessary truths. Since…
Knowledge and Presuppositions
Michael Blome-Tillmann presents an innovative account of epistemic contextualism, based on the idea that pragmatic presuppositions play a central role in the semantics of knowledge attributions. He shows how the theory can resolve sceptical paradoxes and puzzles, and illuminate concerns central to epistemology and philosophy of language
Counter Closure and Knowledge Despite Falsehood
Certain puzzling cases have been discussed in the literature recently which appear to support the thought that knowledge can be obtained by way of deduction from a falsehood; moreover, these cases put pressure, prima facie, on the thesis of counter closure for knowledge. We argue that the cases do not involve knowledge from falsehood; despite appearances, the false beliefs in the cases in question are causally, and therefore epistemologically, in…
Knowledge and implicatures
Conversational Implicatures (and How to Spot Them)
In everyday conversations we often convey information that goes above and beyond what we strictly speaking say: exaggeration and irony are obvious examples. H.P. Grice introduced the technical notion of a conversational implicature in systematizing the phenomenon of meaning one thing by saying something else. In introducing the notion, Grice drew a line between what is said, which he understood as being closely related to the conventional meaning…
Contextualism, Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of ‘Knowledge’‐Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Operators
Jason Stanley has argued recently that Epistemic Contextualism (EC) and Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism (SSI) are explanatorily on a par with regard to certain data arising from modal and temporal embeddings of ‘knowledge’‐ascriptions. This paper argues against Stanley that EC has a clear advantage over SSI in the discussed field and introduces a new type of linguistic datum strongly suggesting the falsity of SSI
Knowledge and implicatures
Conversational Implicatures (and How to Spot Them)
In everyday conversations we often convey information that goes above and beyond what we strictly speaking say: exaggeration and irony are obvious examples. H.P. Grice introduced the technical notion of a conversational implicature in systematizing the phenomenon of meaning one thing by saying something else. In introducing the notion, Grice drew a line between what is said, which he understood as being closely related to the conventional meaning…
Contextualism, Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of ‘Knowledge’‐Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Operators
Jason Stanley has argued recently that Epistemic Contextualism (EC) and Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism (SSI) are explanatorily on a par with regard to certain data arising from modal and temporal embeddings of ‘knowledge’‐ascriptions. This paper argues against Stanley that EC has a clear advantage over SSI in the discussed field and introduces a new type of linguistic datum strongly suggesting the falsity of SSI
Sensitivity Actually
A number of prominent epistemologists claim that the principle of sensitivity “play[s] a starring role in the solution to some important epistemological problems” (DeRose 2010: 161; also Nozick 1981). I argue that traditional sensitivity accounts fail to explain even the most basic data that are usually considered to constitute their primary motivation. To establish this result I develop Gettier and lottery cases involving necessary truths. Since…
Counter Closure and Knowledge Despite Falsehood
Certain puzzling cases have been discussed in the literature recently which appear to support the thought that knowledge can be obtained by way of deduction from a falsehood; moreover, these cases put pressure, prima facie, on the thesis of counter closure for knowledge. We argue that the cases do not involve knowledge from falsehood; despite appearances, the false beliefs in the cases in question are causally, and therefore epistemologically, in…
Contextualism, Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of ‘Knowledge’‐Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Operators
Jason Stanley has argued recently that Epistemic Contextualism (EC) and Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism (SSI) are explanatorily on a par with regard to certain data arising from modal and temporal embeddings of ‘knowledge’‐ascriptions. This paper argues against Stanley that EC has a clear advantage over SSI in the discussed field and introduces a new type of linguistic datum strongly suggesting the falsity of SSI
Knowledge and implicatures
Conversational Implicatures (and How to Spot Them)
In everyday conversations we often convey information that goes above and beyond what we strictly speaking say: exaggeration and irony are obvious examples. H.P. Grice introduced the technical notion of a conversational implicature in systematizing the phenomenon of meaning one thing by saying something else. In introducing the notion, Grice drew a line between what is said, which he understood as being closely related to the conventional meaning…
Knowledge and Presuppositions
Michael Blome-Tillmann presents an innovative account of epistemic contextualism, based on the idea that pragmatic presuppositions play a central role in the semantics of knowledge attributions. He shows how the theory can resolve sceptical paradoxes and puzzles, and illuminate concerns central to epistemology and philosophy of language
Counter Closure and Knowledge Despite Falsehood
Certain puzzling cases have been discussed in the literature recently which appear to support the thought that knowledge can be obtained by way of deduction from a falsehood; moreover, these cases put pressure, prima facie, on the thesis of counter closure for knowledge. We argue that the cases do not involve knowledge from falsehood; despite appearances, the false beliefs in the cases in question are causally, and therefore epistemologically, in…
Sensitivity Actually
A number of prominent epistemologists claim that the principle of sensitivity “play[s] a starring role in the solution to some important epistemological problems” (DeRose 2010: 161; also Nozick 1981). I argue that traditional sensitivity accounts fail to explain even the most basic data that are usually considered to constitute their primary motivation. To establish this result I develop Gettier and lottery cases involving necessary truths. Since…
Impurism, pragmatic encroachment, and the Argument from Principles
Gerken on epistemic focal bias
According to Gerken's psychological explanation of the Bank Case data, our intuitions in the High Standards version of the Bank Case are mistaken and the result of a wider pattern of cognitive error or bias - namely, of epistemic focal bias. In this article, I challenge Gerken's view by pointing out two types of difficulties. First, that the view seems to be subject to counterexamples, and second, that the explanation favoured by Gerken overgener…
Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (7 works) · Psychology (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Linguistics (5 works) · Contextualism (4 works) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (3 works) · Metaphysics (3 works)